STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC

SCHOOL FINANCING-SPENDING DISPARITY BETWEEN WEALTHY SCHOOL DisTRICTS AND POOR URBAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS, CAUSED BY
RELIANCE ON LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES, IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
"THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT EDUCATION" CLAUSE-Abbott By

Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990)
INTRODUCTION

The volatile and heavily politicized debate over public
school funding has been the subject of protracted litigation in
New Jersey' and throughout the United States for nearly two decades. 2 Public school funding statutes which provision revenue
in whole or in part from the local property tax often lead to
school district spending disparities,3 and thus provide fertile
ground for challenges under state constitutional law.4 After establishing a causal link between low property values and the purportedly inadequate school budget, claimants have alleged a
failure by the state to provide the requisite level of education in
violation of the state equal protection or education clauses. 5

I Tractenberg, A ConstitutionalCommitment to Education, 125 N.J.LJ. 1664, col. 1
(1990).
2 See infra note 5 for leading state cases on the issue of school finance. See generally Andersen, State School Finance Litigation, 14 THE URBAN LAWYER 583 (1982) (an

early overview of the leading school finance cases and the potential for future
litigation).
3 Andersen, "State School Finance Litigation," 14 The Urban Lawyer at 585-86.
4 Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 313-15, 575 A.2d 359, 372-73
(1990). School district spending disparities do not present a cognizable claim
under the United States Constitution. San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (strict scrutiny analysis
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not applicable
because public education is not a fundamental right and the wealth of local school
districts is not a suspect classification); Cook, School-Tax Fight Moves to States; Issue
Laid to Rest at FederalLevel, 9 NAT'L L. J. 3, col. 1 (1987).
The decision of a state court invalidating a school finance statute on independent and adequate state constitutional grounds is not susceptible to review by the
United States Supreme Court. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 96 (2d ed. 1983); Gibbons, Like Its Lineage, Abbott Is a Product of the Times, 125
N.J.L.J. 1663, col. 1 (1990).
5 Arkansas, California, Connecticut, and Wyoming have had school finance
laws invalidated under their state equal protection clauses. Dupree v. Alma School
Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 345, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983); Serrano v. Priest, 18
Cal.3d 728, 768, 557 P.2d 929, 952 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 64849, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (1974); Washakie Co. School District No. One v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310, 315 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs Co. School Dist.
No. One v. Washakie Co. School Dist. No. One, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).'
Kentucky, Montana, Texas, and Washington similarly lost to school funding
challenges based on their state education clause. Rose v. The Council for Better
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In New Jersey, lawsuits challenging the structure of school
finance based on local property tax revenue have been adjudicated under the state constitutional mandate of a "thorough and
efficient" public education. 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court
previously struggled to delineate the contours of this clause in
the arduous series of cases comprising the Robinson v. Cahill litiEduc., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary School Dist. One
v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) modified 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990);
Edgewood Independent School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989);
Seattle School Dist. No. One of King Cty. v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 537, 585 P.2d
71, 104 (1978).
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have successfully defended their school finance systems against either or both constitutional
claims. Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90-91, 515 P.2d 590, 592-93 (1973)
(equal protection clause claim); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005, 1110, 1011 (Colo. 1982) (equal protection and state education clause claim);
McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 644-48, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165-68 (1981) (equal
protection and state education clause claim); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho
793, 794, 537 P.2d 635, 636 (1975) (equal protection and state education clause
claim); People of Illinois ex rel.Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App.3d 189, 201, 350 N.E.2d
767, 776 (App. Ct. 1976) (equal protection clause claim); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 639, 657, 458 A.2d 758, 780, 790 (1983) (equal
protection and state education clause claim); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 408,
212 N.W.2d 711, 721 (1973) (equal protection clause claim); Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 49-50, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369-370 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983) (equal protection and state education clause claim);
Board of Educ. of City School Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 388-89, 390
N.E.2d 813, 826 (1979) (equal protection and state education clause claim); Fair
School Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149-50 (Okla.
1987) (equal protection and state education clause claim); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9,
24-27, 554 P.2d 139, 147-48 (1976) (equal protection and state education clause
claim); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 427-28, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (1979) (state education clause claim); Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 348-50, 364
S.E.2d 470, 471-72 (1988) (equal protection and state education clause claim);
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 494, 503-04, 436 N.W.2d 568, 578, 582 (1989),
reh'g denied, 443 N.W.2d 314 (1989) (equal protection and state education clause
claim). Cf. Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W.Va. 672, 708, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (1979) (holding that the fundamental right to education is protected under both the state equal
protection and education clause).
Additionally, lawsuits are being organized in several states, including Illinois
and South Dakota, while the courts in eight other states are presently considering
school funding challenges, including courts in Alaska and Connecticut. See Sullivan, New Jersey Ruling to Lift Aid For Poor Districts, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at B4,
col. 3.
6 N.J. CONST. art VIII, § 4,
1, cl.1. provides:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the state between the ages of five and eighteen years.
See infra notes 106-167 and accompanying text.
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gation.7 In Robinson I,'the court found that discrepancies in local
property wealth invariably led to both per pupil spending disparities and a failure by relatively poor districts to provide a minimum level of substantive education. 9 The supreme court
therefore invalidated the existing public school finance law' in
1973, and ordered the state legislature to craft a new funding
scheme which would comply with its decision.'
The state legislature eventually responded by enacting a new
school finance statute'" which the Robinson V 13 court subsequently sustained as constitutional on its face. 1 4 An historic confrontation nonetheless developed between the court and a
recalcitrant state legislature over the appropriation of funding
for the new law.' 5 This led to the issuance of an injunction by the
7 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (Law Div. 1972), modified, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (Law Div. 1972). Further cases detailing the
issues in this marathon litigation will be cited as follows: Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) [hereinafter Robinson 1]; Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J.
196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973)[hereinafter Robinson II], cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (denying certiorari for Robinson I and Robinson II);
Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975) [hereinafter Robinson III]; Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975), reprinted, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713
(1975) [hereinafter Robinson IV]; Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129
(1976) [hereinafter Robinson VI; Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457
(1976) [hereinafter Robinson VI]; Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400
(1976) [hereinafter Robinson VII].
8 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
9 Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 481, 520, 303 A.2d at 276-77, 297; Robinson V, 69 N.J. at
465-66, 355 A.2d at 137-38; See generally Ruvoldt, EducationalFinancing in New Jersey:
Robinson v. Cahill and Beyond, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1973) (examining the constitutional reasoning in Robinson I).
10 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:58-1 (West 1968). This statute was entitled the
"State School Aid Law (1954)." The Robinson plaintiffs challenged both this statute and its subsequent amendment by the Bateman Act (L. 1970, c. 234, enacted
Oct. 26, 1970, effectiveJuly 1, 1971). Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 228
& n.4, 287 A.2d 187, 190 & n.4 (Law Div. 1972). The entire law was thereafter
repealed by the Public School Education Act of 1975, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A: 7A-I
L. 1975, c. 212, § 54, effective July 1, 1975. The Abbott plaintiffs challenged the
Public School Education Act of 1975 as applied. Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J.
287, 294-95, 575 A.2d 359, 362-63. The Public School Education Act of 1975 was
repealed by the Quality Education Act of 1990, L. 1990, c.52, § 90, effective July 1,
1990.
11 Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 520-21, 303 A.2d at 298; Robinson 11, 63 N.J. at 198, 306
A.2d at 66.
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 et seq. (West 1989 & Supp.), officially titled the
"Public School Education Act of 1975." See supra note 10 for prior statutory
enactments.
13 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
14 Id. at 467, 355 A.2d at 139.
15 See Robinson VI, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
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Robinson VI 6 court to shut down the entire New Jersey school
system for an indefinite period of time commencing in the summer of 1976.17 The subsequent funding of the newly enacted finance statute averted this incipient crisis, 8 and the court
dissolved its injunction in Robinson VII. 9
While Robinson 120 analyzed mere funding disparities, the
scope of the jurisprudential inquiry broadened in Robinson V 2 ' to

include the overall educational content outlined by the legislature.22 Yet the newly funded finance law represented an inherent
political compromise, one which insured that some discrepancy
would persist in the amount of money spent by local school districts.23 Against this contentious backdrop, Abbott By Abbott v.
Burke 24 held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
twenty-eight poor urban school districts because it25provided only
limited equalization of per pupil school spending.
THE PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION ACT OF

1975

At issue in Abbott was the Public School Education Act of
1975 (the Act).2 6 Unlike its predecessor statute, the Act outlined
a broad legislative definition of educational goals for New Jersey
public schools. 2 7 Additionally, the statute provided for compre16 Id.

17 Id. at 160-61, 358 A.2d at 459-60 See infra text accompanying notes 147-56.
A discussion of the separation of powers aspect of this case can be found in Note,
Robinson v. Cahill." A Case Study in Judicial Self-Legitimization, 8 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 508
(1976) [hereinafter Note, Judicial Self-Legitimizationl.
18 A rigorous analysis of the political context of this constitutional dilemma is
contained in LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JU TICE (1978).
19 70 NJ. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
20 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
21 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
22 Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 308, 575 A.2d 359, 369 (1990).
23 Gibbons, supra note 4 at 1678 col. 1.
24 119 NJ. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
25 Id. at 385-86, 575 A.2d at 408-09.
26 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 294-295, 575 A.2d at 362-63. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-I
(West 1989 & Supp.). This statute was enacted to replace prior legislation, consistent with the court's seminal pronouncement in Robinson I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d
273 (1973); Robinson V, 69 N.J. 449, 456, 355 A.2d 129, 132 (1976); see infra notes
106-156 and accompanying text for a description of the interchange between the
supreme court and the state legislature on this contentious matter; see also supra
note 10 for an explanation of the prior and subsequent statutory history.
27 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 308, 575 A.2d at 369-70; Robinson V, 69 N.J. 449, 463, 355
A.2d 129, 136 (1976). These substantive educational provisions of the Act provide
the court with a standard of thorough and efficient education against which the
constitutional adequacy of funding can later be adjudged. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 349,
575 A.2d at 390; Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 464, 355 A.2d at 348.
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hensive monitoring, certification, and enforcement at the state
level through the Department of Education. 8 Most importantly,
the Act provided numerous types of state revenue for public
schools in New Jersey, apart from funds raised by the school district itself out of the local property tax.2 9 The statute specifically

provided state funds for pension aid,3 ° categorical aid,"' transportation aid,3 2 minimum aid," and equalization aid. 4
Equalization aid was the component of funding by which the
state attempted to ameliorate the spending disparities among lo28 Abbott, 119 N.J at 349-52, 575 A.2d at 390-92. Compliance with the statutory
guidelines was effectuated through an involved procedure whereby local school districts filed annual reports concerning their budgets, curriculum, and related operational matters. Id. at 349, 575 A.2d at 390 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-l 1;
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. VI, § 6:8-3.2).
These reports were subsequently reviewed at several county and state levels in
accordance with an intricate scheme of educational indicators specified in N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. VI, § 6:8-4.3, -4.5. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 349-50, 575 A.2d at 390-91. If
a district did not comport with these standards and failed the certification process,
the State Department of Education must initiate a series of measures to rectify the
deficiencies. Id. at 350-52, 575 A.2d at 391-92. This corrective intervention could
include scrutiny by specialized review teams and state compliance units, budget
changes ordered by the State Commissioner of Education, and perhaps a state takeover of a particularly troubled school district. Id. at 351, 352, 575 A.2d at 391-92
(citations omitted). This statutory power has been exercised in the Trenton school
district by the appointment of a state monitor to oversee that district's staffing,
budget, and overall operational program. Id. at 352, 575 A.2d at 391-92 (citations
omitted). In Jersey City a full take-over was initiated by the State Board of Education whereby a state district superintendent was appointed to replace the local district education board and direct all operations of the district. Id.
29 Id. at 324-34, 575 A.2d at 377-82; Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 464, 355 A.2d at 137
(1976).
30 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 329, 575 A.2d at 380. State contributions to the Teacher's
Pension and Annuity Fund totalled $535.8 million for the budget year 1984-85,
with wealthier districts tending to receive more money as a consequence of their
generally higher staff salaries. Id. Although the Abbott Court did not invalidate
state pension aid, the Quality Education Act of 1990 crafted by Governor James
Florio substantially shifted the costs of the pension program to 150 affected local
school districts. Id. at 383-84, 575 A.2d at 407; Hanley, School Officials Vent Anger on
New Jersey FinancingLaw, N.Y. Times, November 1, 1990, at BI, col. 2. See infra note
225.
31 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 328-29, 575 A.2d at 380. Categorical aid partially reimbursed a district for special programs such as compensatory and bilingual education, totalling $315.4 million in 1984-85. Id., 575 A.2d at 380.
32 Id. at 329, 575 A.2d at 380. Transportation aid compensated districts for a
percentage of their total transportation expenditures. Id., 575 A.2d at 380.
33 Id. at 327-328, 575 A.2d at 379-80. In the budget year 1984-85, minimum aid
accounted for $93 million. Id. at 328, 575 A.2d at 379. Minimum aid is discussed
infra note 47 and accompanying text.
34 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 324-27, 575 A.2d at 377-79. Equalization aid totalled $1.9
billion in 1989-90. Id. at 328, 575 A.2d at 380. Equalization aid is described in text
accompanying infra notes 35-47.
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cal school districts caused solely by differences in the aggregate
property wealth 5 possessed by the districts.3 6 Under the statute,
a school district was entitled to receive state equalization aid in
an amount equal to the difference between what the district actually raised through local property taxes and what it would have
raised if its taxable property were valued at 134% of the statewide average school district tax base.37 A school district could
thus raise local property tax revenue as if it possessed a guaranteed tax base (GTB). 8 Pursuant to the law, a local school district
with relatively low property values implemented its property tax
at a given rate, thereby raising a certain amount of local revenue. 39 State equalization aid was subsequently added to these
local funds. 40 The addition of state equalization aid to local revenue equaled the amount of money that would have been yielded
had the local district's chosen tax rate been applied to the statu35 See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 324, 575 A.2d at 377. The property tax base of a school
district is typically defined as the equalized assessed property valuation per pupil in
the school district. Id. at 324, 575 A.2d at 377-78. The term equalized in this context
is a separate and discrete concept from equalization aid. Equalized property valuation is simply the true value of a given district's assessed property wealth as determined annually by the State Division of Taxation. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. 223, 229, 287 A.2d 187, 190 (Law Div. 1972). This state-wide methodology
provides uniformity in the disbursement of subsequent state aid, in contrast to the
varying property tax assessment formulas utilized by the municipalities. Id. (citing
Switz v. Middletown Tp., 23 N.J. 580, 586, 130 A.2d 15, 18 (1950)); Robinson IV, 69
NJ. 449, 478-79, 355 A.2d 129, 144 & n.3 (1976); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A: 7A-3, 18a (West 1989 & Supp.).
36 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 324, 575 A.2d at 377-78. In 1985-86, property tax bases
among school districts in N.J. ranged from $22,322 to $7.8 million. Id. at 325-26,
575 A.2d at 378. 58% of the school districts in New Jersey had property tax bases
below the mean of the above figures. Id.
37 Id. at 324, 575 A.2d at 377-78 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-3, -18a).
Equalization aid thus afforded every district with a state guaranteed property value
on which to assess a local school tax. Robinson V, 69 NJ. 449, 478-79, 355 A.2d 129,
144-45 (1976) (Conford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 324, 575 A.2d at 377-78. The GTB was set at 134% of the
state-wide average school district property tax base. Id. This allowed districts with
actual assessed property values below the GTB to raise funds as if their tax base
equalled the GTB. Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 478-479, 355 A.2d at 144. (Conford, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39 Abbott, 119 NJ. at 324, 575 A.2d at 378. The implementation of a property
tax is inherently a decision made by a local school district. Id. at 351, 575 A.2d at
391. Although the State Commissioner of Education had the statutory power to
force a school board to raise revenue, or reorder budget priorities, this power was
never meaningfully exercised. Id. See also supra note 28.
40 Abbott, 119 NJ. at 324, 575 A.2d at 378. Equalization aid for the budget year
1984-85 was $1.24 billion. Id. In 1985-86, equalization aid had risen to $1.34 billion. Id.
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tory GTB. 4 '
Significantly, equalization aid did not fully eliminate spending disparities among school districts in the state. 42 Equalization
aid could not compensate for the fact that some school districts
would tax the GTB at higher rates to reflect a greater local em-

phasis on education.4 3 Thus, the ability of districts to freely set
tax rates and budget priorities of their own choosing ensured
continued disparities in per pupil spending. 44 Per pupil spending disparities were further exacerbated by the fact that poorer
urban schools contained nearly twice the number of students
than their affluent suburban counterparts.4 5 Moreover, a third of

the school districts in New Jersey enjoyed property tax bases well
in excess of the GTB.4 6 Finally, the Act dispensed minimum aid
to those school districts with tax bases above the GTB, further

widening the budget disparities already present under the limited
equalization scheme.4 7
4' Id. The GTB for the fiscal year 1984-85 totalled $223,100, while in the fiscal
year 1985-86, the guaranteed tax base was $250,927. Id.
42 Id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 382-83. Federal aid under 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 (Supp.
1989) to poor urban school districts in New Jersey significantly reduced the disparity in per pupil expenditures between these districts and the more affluent school
districts. Id. at 330, 575 A.2d at 380. As an example, federal aid was disbursed to
districts in the following amounts:
$808 per pupil
Newark
$394 per pupil
Camden
$480 per pupil
Trenton
$166 per pupil
East Orange
$244 per pupil
Paterson
$471 per pupil
Jersey City
$320 per pupil
Irvington
Id. Nonetheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court excluded federal aid from its constitutional analysis of school financing because 20 U.S.C.A. § 2854 expressly prohibits state consideration of federal aid in the allocation of subsequent state aid,
and because of the substantial fluctuation in the availability of federal funds. Id. at
330-32, 575 A.2d at 381-82.
43 Id. at 325, 575 A.2d at 378. "[A] district can decide to raise $5 million or $2
million; under the Act that is a matter solely for the district to decide." Id.
44 See id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 383.
45 Id. at 334-35, 575 A.2d at 383. "[O]n the average, in 1984-85, a group of
richer districts with 189,484 students spent 40% more per pupil than a group of
poorer districts with 355,612 students; one provides an education worth $4,029 per
pupil, the other, $2,861." Id. (footnote omitted).
46 See id. at 325, 575 A.2d at 378. Thus, those school districts with aggregate
property values in excess of the GTB would derive greater revenues from property
tax rates comparable to those rates levied by districts at or below the GTB. See id. at
325-26, 575 A.2d at 378. While the GTB was $223,100 in 1984-85, one-third of the
school districts in New Jersey possessed property tax bases ranging from $223,667
to $7.8 million. Id. These affluent school districts thus had an intrinsic advantage
over the remaining two-thirds of the school districts in the state which received
equalization aid derived from the GTB of $223,100. Id.
47 Id. at 327-28, 575 A.2d at 379. Given that minimum aid went only to those
school districts which did not receive equalization aid, the court concluded that
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Although the Act ostensibly sought to narrow the differences
in the per pupil expenditures among school districts, these educational funding disparities actually increased since the enactment
of the law.48 When the districts were statistically ranked in order
of per pupil expenditures, the difference in spending between the
5th and 95th percentile 49 was $898 in 1975-76, the fiscal year
preceding the Act."0 Nine years after implementation of the Act
however, per pupil spending disparities among the same group
of school districts had widened to $2,068, or $1,135 adjusted for
inflation. 5 '
The rising disparity in educational funding could further be
gleaned from other types of statistical analysis. 52 The State Department of Education classified New Jersey's 61653 school districts into ten District Factor Groups (DFGs), based on a variety
of relevant socioeconomic indicia. 54 These DFGs were subseminimum aid was intrinsically counterequalizing. Id. at 328, 575 A.2d at 379. The
court suggested that the rationale for dispensing minimum aid to school districts
with comparatively higher property wealth was to "[fQacilitate the compromises
needed to secure passage of important legislation of this kind." Id. at 384, 575 A.2d
at 408. Two hundred and seven, or 34.4% of the school districts in NewJersey had
aggregate property values in excess of the GTB and thus received minimum aid in
1985-86. Id. at 327-328, n.12, 575 A.2d at 379, n.12. In the budget year 1989-90,
minimum aid accounted for a mere $163 million, while equalization aid totalled
$1.9 billion. Id. at 328, 575 A.2d at 380. This minimum aid was distributed to 265
New Jersey school districts. See Sullivan, School Aid Ruling: The Court and Society, N.Y.
Times, June 10, 1990, at 1, col.l.
48 Id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 382.
49 Id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 383. "Plaintiffs' expert calculated the range of expenditure disparity from 1975-76 through 1984-85 from the fifth to the ninety-fifth
percentiles, i.e., she excluded from her analysis those districts, each containing five
percent of the pupils in the state, with expenditures at the highest and lowest extremes." Id., 575 A.2d at 382.
50 Id. In the fiscal year 1975-76, school districts ranked at the 5th percentile
spent $1,076 per pupil and school districts in the 95th percentile spent $1,974. Id.
51 Id. In the fiscal year 1984-85, the ninety-fifth percentile districts spent $4,755
per pupil, as opposed to districts in the fifth percentile which spent $2,687, a discrepancy of $2,068. Id.
52 See id. at 338-47, 575 A.2d at 384-89.
53 Bird, Abbott's Shrewd Activism, Deference, 125 N.J.L.J. 1604, at col. 2. (1990).
54 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 338-39, 575 A.2d at 385. The District Factor Groups
(DFGs) were classified according to the following criteria:
1. Per capita income level
2. Occupation level
3. Education level
4. Percentage of residents below the poverty level
5. Density (average number of persons per household)
6. Urbanization (percent of district deemed urban)
7. Unemployment
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quently designated A through J, with DFG A representing those
districts with the lowest socioeconomic conditions, and DFG J
representing districts with the highest socioeconomic status.55
Comparatively, the per pupil expenditures of school districts in
DFGs A and B were significantly less than DFGs I and J school
districts.56
In the budget year 1984-85, per pupil expenditures for
school districts in DFG A averaged $2,909, while those in DFG J
averaged $4,154. 57 These spending disparities among the school
districts were correlated with the aggregate levels of property
wealth which the respective school districts possessed. 58 Again in
1984-85, the average DFG A per pupil property valuation was
$78,222, as compared to a $360,101 property valuation per pupil
in DFG J districts. 59 Among twenty-eight poor urban school districts' within DFGs A and B, the average per pupil property valuation was $63,066, while the average per pupil expenditure was
$2,880.61 The DFG analysis therefore corroborated the supreme
court's earlier statistical finding that disparities in school district
55 Id. at 339, 575 A.2d at 385. The DFG classification scheme was implemented
by the Department of Education in 1974 to permit school districts to assess their
performance against other districts of comparable socioeconomic status. Id. at 33839, 575 A.2d at 385. The supreme court challenged the DFG comparison as embodying the implicit notion that lower socioeconomic districts could not compete
with higher socioeconomic school districts and should thus be judged by different
standards. Id. at 339, 575 A.2d at 385. The court rejected this approach because it
would likely consign children to an education forever inferior to that provided by
affluent school districts. Id. at 338, 575 A.2d at 385.
56 Id. at 346-47 & n.21, 575 A.2d at 388-89 & n.21.
57 Id. at 344, 575 A.2d at 388. The combined per pupil spending of DFGs A and
B averaged $2,861 in 1984-85. Id. DFGs I andJ by contrast averaged $4,029 in per
pupil expenditures for the same period. Id.
58 Id. at 335, 575 A.2d at 383. See also id. at 345, 575 A.2d at 388 (The court
concluded that the property wealth possessed by a given school district significantly
influenced the amount of money that district would spend on its schools.).
59 Id. at 344, 575 A.2d at 388.
60 Poor urban school districts were defined by the court as those urban municipalities which received state urban aid from the Department of Community Affairs,
pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-178 to -181. Id. at 340-41, 575 A.2d at 386.
The supreme court found this statutory classification instructive for identifying
those urban school districts which would be included in its remedy. See id. at 342 &
n. 18, 575 A.2d at 386 & n. 18. The Department of Community Affairs classified 56
municipalities as urban aid districts. Id. at 340-42, 575 A.2d at 386. DFGs A and B
contain 29 of these urban aid districts, which the court characterized as the most
impoverished municipalities in New Jersey. Id. at 342 & n.18, 575 A.2d at 386 &
n. 18. The supreme court's remedy includes 28 of these poor urban school districts.
Id. Atlantic City, an urban aid district within DFG A, was excluded from the court's
remedy based on its ample commercial property wealth. Id.
61 Id. at 345, 575 A.2d at 388. These figures are again for 1984-85. Id.
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property wealth led to disparities in school district per pupil
spending.62
The causal link between property values and per pupil expenditures could not be established in the 339 middle districts,
designated DFGs C through H.63 There was no evidence probative of a positive correlation between property wealth and school
spending in these middle districts.64 Some school districts in
DFGs C through H with relatively low property values spent
more per pupil than the state-wide average. 65 Thus, the only significant and justiciable spending disparities were manifested at
the socioeconomic extremes of DFGs A-B and I-J.
,
These spending disparities at the socioeconomic extremes
ultimately resulted in poor urban school districts providing their
students with an inferior level of education. In the school year
1985-86, every poor urban school district within DFG A and B
failed the basic skills High School Proficiency Test. 6 Additionally, the physical facilities within these school districts were in a
Id. at 335, 575 A.2d at 383. See also id. at 345, 575 A.2d at 388.
Id. at 336-37 & n.15, 575 A.2d at 383-84 & n. 15. DFGs C through H represent those districts of median socioeconomic status which lie between the extremes
of the poor DFG A and B and the affluent DFG I and J districts. Id. These middle
districts, containing 575,181 students (or 60% of New Jersey students), did not
exhibit the disparity in spending revealed by comparing those other school districts
at the socioeconomic extremes. Id. at 336, 575 A.2d at 383; Lehne, The Unanswered
Question: Who Pays for Abbott? 125 N.J.L.J. 1665 (1990).
64 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 336, 575 A.2d at 384.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 336-37, 575 A.2d at 384.
67 Id. at 357-58, 575 A.2d at 394. The court opined that "the level of education
offered to students in some of the poorer urban districts is tragically inadequate."
Id. at 359, 575 A.2d at 395.
68 Id. at 369-70, 575 A.2d at 400. The state standard for a satisfactory performance by a school district is a 75% pass rate for all the district's ninth grade students
in reading, writing, and math. Id. at 369, 575 A.2d at 400.
In 1985-86, of more than 14,000 ninth graders in school districts in
DFG A who took the [proficiency test], only 54% passed the reading
test, 42% passed the math test, and 43% passed writing ... In Newark, [a poor urban district within DFG A], only 41% of ninth graders... passed reading, 31% passed math, and 39% passed writing. In
Camden [another DFG A poor urban district], 36% passed reading,
28% passed math, and 44% passed writing. By contrast, in school
districts in DFGJ, of 5,400 ninth graders tested, 97% passed reading,
93% passed math and 95% passed writing. Statewide, 83% of students tested passed reading, 72% passed math, and 77% passed
writing.
Id. at 370, 575 A.2d at 400 (foonote omitted). The court further found that "[tihe
Legislature regards these tests as a prerequisite to, not an equivalent of, a thorough
and efficient education." Id. at 369, 575 A.2d at 400.
62
63
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state of serious deterioration and disrepair. 69 For example, the
lunchroom of a Paterson elementary school was located in a
boiler room area of the basement, while remedial classes were
held in a converted bathroom.70 In Irvington, music class was
held in a storage room, and remedial classes were conducted in
former closets.71 A Jersey City school's library was once a cloakroom, and the nurse's office lacked the most basic hygienic
facilities.72
In contrast, affluent school districts enjoyed state of the art
facilities.73 These districts provided their students with not only
the basic skills, but with the full array of educational offerings.74
Princeton, an affluent school district, provided one computer for
every eight children, while the ratio in Camden was one per fiftyeight children. 75 Foreign language instruction in Montclair began at the pre-school level, as compared to Paterson which began
its foreign language instruction in the tenth grade.7 6 Music and
art programs also suffered from insufficient funding and inadequate staffing in the poor urban districts.77 Physical education
and the vocational arts were likewise hampered in these schools
78
as a result of deficient facilities and substandard equipment.
THE LOWER COURT RULINGS

On February 5, 1981, Raymond Arthur Abbott 79 and twenty
69 Id. at 362, 575 A.2d at 397. In contrast, a school district must have adequate
physical facilities as a statutory requirement of a thorough and efficient education.
Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-5f. (West 1989 & Supp.).
70 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 363, 575 A.2d at 397.
71 Id. Likewise, in Irvington, a classroom had been converted from a coal bin.
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 359-64, 575 A.2d at 395-97.
75 Id. at 359, 575 A.2d at 395. Camden can only provide computer lessons to
3.4% of the students. Id.
76 Id. at 360, 575 A.2d at 396.
77 Id. at 361, 575 A.2d at 396.
78 ld. at 361-62, 575 A.2d at 396.
79 Raymond Abbott, the lead plaintiff in the suit, was a 12 year-old schoolboy
from Camden when this action was instituted in 1981. Sullivan, New Jersey Ruling to
Lift School Aid For Poor Districts, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at B4, col. 5. Mr. Abbott
received news of the court's holding in the Camden County Jail, where he was
awaiting sentencing for a probation violation arising from burglary and the theft of
a truck. Id. Mr. Abbott urged children to "realize that if they stay in school and
learn that [sic] maybe they won't end up here in jail." Id.
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other students 8° instituted a class action suit 8 ' in the Superior
Court, Chancery Division, Mercer County, alleging that the funding provisions of the Public School Education Act of 197582 (the
Act) were unconstitutional as applied. 83 The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available through the State
Commissioner of Education.8 4 Subsequently, the Superior
Court, Appellate Division reversed and remanded for trial, noting that the plaintiffs had not merely stated an administrative
claim under the statute, but rather a constitutional challenge to
the entire New Jersey school funding system itself.8 5 The New
Jersey Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition for certification, 6 and reversed the appellate division's ruling, remanding the case for an administrative proceeding.8 7
The supreme court held that the presence of both constitu80 Id. The plaintiff students were from Camden, East Orange, Irvington, and
Jersey City. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 296, 575 A.2d at 363.
81 Under N.J. CT. R. 4:32, the plaintiffs were certified as a class for all students in
the public schools of Camden, East Orange, Irvington, and Jersey City. Abbott v.
Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 277-78 n.l, 495 A.2d 376, 380 n.l (1985). The plaintiffs' case
nonetheless utilized proofs regarding education statewide, consistent with the defendants' consent and the trial court order. Id.
82 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-I (West 1989 & Supp.). The prior and subsequent
statutory history of the Act is detailed supra note 10.
83 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 300, 575 A.2d at 365. The plaintiffs' complaint named the
State Commissioner of Education, the State Board of Education, the State Treasurer, and the State Director of Budget and Accounting as defendants. Abbott, 100
N.J. at 278, 495 A.2d at 380. The complaint alleged that the finance provisions of
the Public School Education Act of 1975 were violative of the thorough and efficient education clause and the equal protection clauses of the New Jersey Constitution, and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
84 Abbott v. Burke, 195 N.J. Super. 59, 61-64, 477 A.2d 1278, 1279-80 (App.
Div. 1984). The trial court premised its holding on NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:6-9
(West 1989 & Supp.), under which the Education Commissioner is vested with jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the Act. Id. at 64, 477 A.2d at 1280. The
trial court opinion of Judge Virginia Long was unreported. Id. at 62, 477 A.2d at
1279; The Star-Ledger (Newark), June 6, 1990, at 13, col. 4.
85 Abbott, 195 NJ. Super. at 73, 477 A.2d at 1285. Judge Antell, writing for the
appellate division, explained that the relief sought by the complainants involved
more than corrective measures available through an administrative proceeding. Id.
Instead, the plaintiffs raised questions of constitutional law outside the expertise of
the Commissioner of Education. Id. The appellate division explained that the doctrine which requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies is only applicable
when the remedies are "certainly available, clearly effective and completely adequate to right the wrong complained of." Id. (citing Baldwin Const. Co. v. Essex
County Bd. of Taxation, 24 NJ. Super. 252, 274, 93 A.2d 800, 810 (Law Div. 1952),
aff'd 27 N.J. Super. 240, 99 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1953), aff'd 16 NJ. 329, 108 A.2d
598 (1954)).
86 Abbott v. Burke, 97 NJ. 669, 483 A.2d 187 (1984).
87 Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 303, 495 A.2d 376, 394 (1985).
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tional and statutory issues did not preclude an administrative
proceeding.88 Given the extraordinary complexity of the litigation, the supreme court determined that an administrative hearing could best compile the factual record necessary for eventual
constitutional adjudication.8 9 The court thereafter transferred
the case to the Commissioner of Education for a hearing by the
New Jersey Office of Administrative Law.90
On remand, the administrative law judge ruled that under
the statutory funding provisions, disparities in school district
property wealth resulted in unequal educational opportunity in
contravention of the thorough and efficient education clause. 9 '
While acknowledging educational deficiencies in certain school
districts, the Commissioner and the New Jersey State Board of
Education rejected the conclusion of the administrative law judge
that the Act was unconstitutional.92 The New Jersey Supreme
88 Id. at 297, 495 A.2d at 391. Justice Handler, writing for the court, determined
that plaintiffs can seek an administrative remedy, or alternatively, relief through a
trial court, except where an administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction by statute. Id. (citation omitted). The court stated that the trial court should always consider whether assigning a case to an administrative proceeding would best serve the
interests of justice. Id.
89 Id. at 299-300, 495 A.2d at 392-3. The court characterized the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies as a matter solely for judicial discretion. Abbott, 100 N.J. at 297-99, 495 A.2d at 391-92. In the instant case, Justice
Handler proffered that an administrative law judge was better equipped to assess
the myriad issues of educational funding, the relationship to taxable property
wealth, and the requisite level of substantive education. Id., 495 A.2d at 392-93.
90 Id. at 301-02, 495 A.2d at 393. Normally, the Commissioner of Education
would have jurisdiction over administrative disputes arising under the Act pursuant
to N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:6-9. Yet because the Commissioner was a party defendant in the action, the case was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law.
Abbott, 100 N.J. at 302 n.6, 495 A.2d 393-94 n.6 (citing N.J.CT.R. 1:12-1(f)).
91 Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 297, 575 A.2d 359, 364 (1990).
Administrative Law Judge Steven Lefelt found a causal link between disparities in
educational funding and the varying degrees of property wealth in the school districts. Id; The Star-Ledger (Newark), June 6, 1990, at 13, col. 4. The resulting inadequacy of education in the plaintiffs' districts constituted a violation of the
thorough and efficient clause of the state constitution. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 297-98,
575 A.2d at 364.
92 Id. at 298-300, 575 A.2d at 364-65. The State Board of Education had the
authority to reject the holding of the administrative law judge by adopting the
Commissioner's contrary findings of law and fact. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14F-7.
The Commissioner specifically contested:
1. the existence of a correlation between district property
wealth and per pupil expenditures;
2. the methodology by which the [a]dministrative [l]aw []udge
reached his factual findings, and;
3. the focus by the [a]dministrative [i1aw .j]udge on equality of
education rather than on minimum substantive education.
Id. at 298-300, 575 A.2d at 364-65.
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Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for direct certification 9" and
reversed the Board of Education's decision. 94 In a seminal pronouncement, the supreme court held that educational spending
in twenty-eight poor urban school districts must remain substantially equal to that of the most affluent school districts; 95 that
minimum aid to wealthy districts must be terminated;96 and that
funding for the poor urban school districts could not depend
upon the willingness of these districts to exact sufficient revenue
from the local property tax.9 7
PRIOR LAW

Historically, judicial construction of the thorough and efficient education clause9" has not required absolute equality of education throughout the state. 99 In Landis v. Ashworth (School
District No. 44),100 the New Jersey Supreme Court for the first

time examined the constitutional obligation imposed on the
state.' O' Landis involved a taxpayer's challenge to the validity of
school district property taxation on the theory that the tax would
enable different districts to provide different levels of substantive
education in violation of the state education clause.10 2 While recognizing that the thorough and efficient education clause re93 Abbott v. Burke, 117 N.J. 51, 563 A.2d 818 (1989). The appeal thus bypassed
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 300, 575
A.2d at 365.
94 Id. at 394, 575 A.2d at 412.
95 Id. at 385-86, 575 A.2d at 408.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 386, 575 A.2d at 409.
1, cl.l. provides:
98 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4,
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this State between the ages of five and eighteen years.
This provision was amended to the New Jersey Constitution by popular vote in
1875. Williams, With Abbott, Justices in for The Long Haul, 125 N.J.L.J. 1664, col. l
(1990). The recommendation for this clause came from the Constitutional Commission appointed in 1873 by Governor Joel Parker. Id.
99 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 304-05, 575 A.2d at 367-68; see Robinson I, 62 N.J. 473, 514,
303 A.2d 273, 294 (1973).
100 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (1895).
101 See id.
102 Landis, 57 N.J.L. at 511-12, 31 A. at 1018. The plaintiff in Landis sought an
abatement of district property taxes, rather than constitutional protection of an educational right. Id. It was within this jurisprudential context that the supreme court
explored the contours of the thorough and efficient education clause. Id. at 512, 31
A. at 1018.
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quired a minimum level of substantive education,' 0 3 the supreme

court nonetheless stated that local school districts had the option
to go further and provide additional education. 1 4 The court
therefore held that a district could provide high school education

consistent with the education clause, despite the fact that secondary schooling
was generally not available throughout the state at
10 5
the time.
This rather limited construction of the state education clause
underwent considerable evolution in the marathon series of cases
comprising the Robinson v. Cahill litigation.' 0 6 In Robinson I, °7
students, taxpayers, and educational administrators instituted a
class action challenge to the State School Aid Law (1954).108
Under the law, 67% of all public school funding was derived
from local property taxation.' 0 9 Since districts with low property
values would have less ability to raise tax revenue, the trial
court" 0 held that the finance law would foster disparate educa103 Id. The minimum amount of education which the state had to provide was
defined by the court as "such instruction as is necessary to fit [a child] for the ordinary duties of citizenship.. ." Id.
104 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court further explained that the state constitution did not preclude the state from delegating its obligation under the thorough
and efficient education clause to local school districts. Id. at 511, 31 A. at 1018.
105 Id. at 512, 31 A. at 1018. Justice Dixon, writing for a unanimous court, rejected the notion that the state must ensure secondary education for all:
Nor can I think that the constitution requires the legislature to provide the same means of instruction for every child in the state. A
scheme to accomplish that result would compel either the abandonment of all public schools designed for the higher education of youth
or the establishment of such schools in every section of the state...
Neither of these consequences was contemplated by the amendment
of 1875.
Id. At the time, secondary schooling was not widely available in New Jersey. Robinson I, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (1973) (citation omitted).
106 See infra notes 107-156 and accompanying text. See supra note 7 (listing the
eight cases in the Robinson litigation).
107 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273.
108 Id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 296; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 228, 287
A.2d 187, 189-90 (Law Div. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:58-1 (repealed). Prior
to Robinson I, the law was amended by the Bateman Act, named after then state
Senator Raymond H. Bateman (Somerset County). Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. at 228 & n.4, 287 A.2d at 190 & n.4. Senator Bateman chaired the State Aid
to School Districts Study Commission which recommended changes in existing
school finance legislation, leading to the law which was challenged by the Robinson
plaintiffs. Id. See also Abbott v. Burke, 100 NJ. at 280, 495 A.2d at 381. See supra
note 10 for discussion of school finance statutory history.
109 Id.; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. at 231, 287 A.2d at 191.
110 The trial court opinion of Judge Botter was reported, 118 N.J. Super. 223,
287 A.2d 187 (Law Div. 1972) modified 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (Law Div.
1972).
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tional expenditures in violation of the equal protection clause of
both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions."' The
New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently affirmed on alternative
grounds,' 1 reasoning that per pupil expenditure disparities
under the statute were violative of the thorough and efficient education clause.' '3
The Robinson I court did not mandate absolute equality in
school spending, but rather implied that the state constitution
required a minimum level of substantive education for all. 1 "
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Weintraub explained that the state must provide an education adequate
enough to prepare a student for a constructive role in modern
society. 15 The supreme court further noted that individual
school districts were free to exceed this established level of thorough and efficient education.'1 6 Consequently, the court care"' Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. at 275, 287 A.2d at 214, modified, 119 N.J.
Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569; Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. at 280, 495 A.2d at 381; U.S.
CONsTrr. amend. XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), art. VII § IV, par. I.
112 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 481, 521, 303 A.2d at 277, 299 ("[w]e do not accept the
constitutional thesis expounded by the trial court"). Id. at 521, 303 A.2d at 277.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g
denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny analysis under the federal equal protection clause did not apply to a Texas
school finance law which relied in part on local property taxes because the property
wealth of school districts is not a suspect classification, and there is no fundamental
right to public education. Id. at 28, 35.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court decided San Antonio after the
trial court decision in Robinson I, but before the New Jersey Supreme Court decision
in Robinson I. Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 486, 303 A.2d at 279. The New Jersey Supreme
Court was therefore precluded from utilizing the federal equal protection clause to
invalidate the school finance law, despite the fact that the trial court had utilized the
federal equal protection clause to invalidate the law. Id. at 488-89, 303 A.2d at 28081. The New Jersey Supreme Court therefore applied the thorough and efficient
education clause of the state constitution to an evidentiary record which the litigants had specifically crafted for an equal protection clause argument. See Gibbons,
supra note 3-4, at col. 3. "Thus, the opinion in Robinson I, which relied on the
thorough-and-efficient clause of the New Jersey Constitution, was flawed by the fact
that the record had been compiled for a purpose different than the ground of decision upon which the New Jersey Supreme Court relied." Id.
1'3 Robinson !, 62 N.J. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295. The Robinson I trial court noted
that "the constitutional demand had not been met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input per pupil." Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
'14 Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
115 Id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. The court posited that the state constitution's
guarantee must be "understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is
needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his [or her] role as a citizen
and as a competitor in the labor market." Id.
116 Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298; See also Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287,
306-07, 575 A.2d 359, 369 (1990) (The Abbott court elaborated that local school
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fully characterized the Landis 117 decision as requiring equality of
education only below the high school level, premised on the implicit assumption that elementary schooling was sufficiently thorough and efficient for the late 19th century. "8
Justice Weintraub also acknowledged the intrinsic limitations of a legal analysis based exclusively on financial disparity,
yet nevertheless maintained that the plaintiffs had adduced a positive correlation between per pupil spending and educational
quality." 9 The court explained that there was simply no other
statutory or evidentiary criteria by which it could juridically
gauge constitutional compliance. 2 ° After detailing the obligations of the state in broad terms, the court held that the legislature must statutorily define a thorough and efficient education,
and ensure that local school districts meet their educational responsibility. 12 1 Justice Weintraub concluded by seeking from the
parties any additional alternatives, other than those proposed by
the legislature, on the distribution of public funds by the
legislature. 122
In the following three years, tension between the NewJersey
Supreme Court and the state legislature over the implementation
of a remedy began to overshadow the substantive content of the
Robinson I court's landmark decision. 123 This confrontation between the branches of state government implicated an incipient
yet alarming separation of powers crisis. 12 4 In Robinson 11125 the
supreme court postponed remedial action in anticipation of corrective legislation, 12 6 and then in Robinson 1111 2 7 extended the
districts were free to exceed the minimum constitutional mandate, so long as the
state provided that minimum substantive education to all districts).
117 Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (1895). See supra notes 100-05
and accompanying text.
118 Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 514-15, 303 A.2d at 294-95; Abbott, 119 NJ. at 304-05,
575 A.2d at 367-68.
119 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
120 Id. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295.
121 Id. at 513, 519-20, 303 A.2d at 294, 297.
122 Id. at 521, 303 A.2d at 298.
123 See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 304, 575 A.2d at 367.
124 Id.; Note, Robinson v. Cahill. A Case Study in Judicial Self-Legitimization, 8 Rutr.CAM. L.J. 508 (1976). State Senator Alfred N. Beadleston (Monmouth County)
later opined: "I don't believe they have the authority to do what they've done.
They've put a pistol to the head of the [L]egislature and the [g]overnor and I, for
one, am prepared to defy them." Anastasia, Marcase Says Schools Need 'Survival'
Funds, The Philadelphia Inquirer, May 14, 1976, at 6-A, col. 6.
125 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973), cert.denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 976 (1973).
126 Robinson H, 63 N.J. at 198, 306 A.2d at 66. In a per curiam opinion, the court
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deadline after which it would impose injunctive relief.12 Finally,
with its deadline marked by continued legislative inaction, an impatient Robinson IV 129 court crafted a provisional remedy for the

school year commencing July 1, 1976.130 Prior to the effective
date of this order however, the legislature enacted the Public
School Education Act of 1975.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court thereafter sustained the new
education law as facially constitutional in Robinson V.' 3 2 In a per

curiam opinion, the court noted that the Act provided a broad
33
and flexible definition of a thorough and efficient education.1
The court approved of this statutory definition, explaining that a
standard of substantive education was now set forth against
which the constitutional obligation could be more fully adjudicated. 13 4 Additionally, the supreme court described-the new administrative mechanisms by which the state would monitor,
supplement, and enforce the promulgated standards on a disdeclared: "It is our view that the [c]ourt should not disturb the statutory scheme
unless the Legislature fails to enact, by December 31, 1974, legislation compatible
with our decision in this case and effective no later than July 1, 1975." Id.
127 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975).
128 Robinson III, 67 N.J. at 37, 335 A.2d at 7. In a memorandum order, Chief
Justice Hughes acknowledged that "it would be inequitable and, indeed, chaotic as
to many school districts to effect financial changes for the 1975-76 school year at
this late date and on such short notice." Id. The court invited oral argument on the
subject of relief for the school year beginning July 1, 1976. Id.
129 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975). This opinion originally appeared in 67 N.J.
333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975), but was reprinted due to a typographical omission.
130 Robinson IV, 69 N.J. at 144, 351 A.2d at 718. ChiefJustice Hughes, writing
for the majority, observed that:
The Court has now come face to face with a constitutional exigency
involving, on a level of plain, stark and unmistakable reality, the constitutional obligation of the Court to act .... [W]e have more than
once stayed our hand, with appropriate respect for the province of
other Branches of government. In final alternative, we must now proceed to enforce the constitutional right involved.
Id. at 139-40, 351 A.2d at 716. The remedy forged by the court ordered increases
in state equalization aid while enjoining disbursement of minimum aid to school
districts with higher levels of assessed property wealth for the school year 1976-77.
Id. at 149-51, 351 A.2d at 721-22; Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 281-82, 495 A.2d
376, 382 (1985); Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 307, 575 A.2d 359, 369
(1990). ChiefJustice Hughes entertained the possibility that the executive or legislative branch would still formulate a funding plan in time for the 1976-77 school
year, thus obviating the need for the court's action. Robinson IV, 69 N.J. at 144-45 &
n.4, 351 A.2d at 718-19 & n.4.
131 Abbott, 100 N.J. at 282, 495 A.2d at 382; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-I (West
1989 & Supp.).
132 69 N.J. 449, 467, 355 A.2d 129, 139 (1976).
'33 Id. at 457-58, 355 A.2d at 133; Abbott, 119 N.J. at 303, 575 A.2d at 367.
134 Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 456, 355 A.2d at 132.
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trict-by-district basis.' 3 5

In the context of this broadened jurisprudential inquiry, the
Robinson V court once again considered the issue of spending disparities resulting from the continued reliance upon local property taxation by the school district. 36 The court thus
acknowledged that the improved funding provisions would still
not fully eliminate spending disparities among New Jersey school
districts. 37 As a threshold matter, the court stressed that per pupil spending disparities, absent additional proof, were no longer
solely dispositive of a constitutional violation. 38 The supreme
-court instead clarified that spending disparities were relevant
only to the extent that the new Act did not afford a thorough and
efficient education upon its full implementation. 139 The court
thus suggested that future experience with the new law might
conclusively demonstrate its constitutional infirmity as applied. 40 Finally, the majority conditioned its holding on the legislature effectuating the full
funding of the new law in time for
14 1
the 1976-77 school year.

In a foreshadowing concurrence, ChiefJustice Hughes maintained that the continued inequality of spending in itself
threatened the long term constitutionality of the new law.' 42 The
Justice elaborated that, while a marked improvement, the Act still
failed to truly equalize the tax resources and per pupil expenditures of New Jersey school districts. 4 3 Chief Justice Hughes ex135 Id. at 458-60, 355 A.2d at 133-35. The administrative mechanism by which
the state would monitor local school districts is described at supra note 28.
136 Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 463-64, 355 A.2d at 136-37.
137 Id. at 464, 355 A.2d at 137. The court found that the Act would equalize the
spending ability of 368 out of 578 school districts, an improvement over the prior
State School Aid Law (1954). Id. at 465 n.4, 355 A.2d at 137 n.4; Abbott, 119 N.J. at
310, 575 A.2d at 370.
138 Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 464, 355 A.2d at 137. "We cannot say that under these
circumstances the dollar input per pupil ... will not be sufficient to offer each pupil
an equal educational opportunity as required by the Constitution." Id.
'39 Id., 355 A.2d at 136-37; Abbott, 119 NJ. at 309-10, 575 A.2d at 370.
140 Robinson V, 69 NJ. at 455, 355 A.2d at 131-32. "Parenthetically, we note that
whether [the law] may or may not pass constitutional muster as applied in the future to any individual school district ... must quite obviously await the event." Id.
141 Id. at 467, 355 A.2d at 139.
142 Id. at 470-71, 355 A.2d at 140 (Hughes, CJ., concurring). -[T]he long record
of this whole case demonstrates that the local school district insufficiencies . . .
[resulted) from deficient financial resources; deficiencies so obviously attributable
to imbedded and invidious disparities in the tax bases of so many of our communities." Id. (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
143 Id. at 473-74, 355 A.2d at 142 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
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plicated that municipal overburden 44 in poor school districts
might preclude a constitutionally adequate education, despite the
remedial powers of the Commissioner and the State Board of Education. 1 4 5 Along with the majority, the Chief Justice tacitly encouraged the state to implement further legislation to more
meaningfully equalize poor school district with wealthy district
146
expenditures, thus averting the probability of future litigation.
Four months after this decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court once again revisited the school financing dispute in Robinson VI. 147 After the Legislature failed to provide the requisite

funding for the new education law, the supreme court issued an
injunction to close the entire New Jersey school system for the
indefinite future beginning in the summer of 1976.148 The
court's extraordinary remedy subsequently provoked a veritable
firestorm of popular criticism and political controversy. 149 Jus144 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 355-57, 575 A.2d at 393-94. Municipal overburden is the
term used by the court to describe poor districts with the dual handicap of low
property values and an excessive need for noneducational municipal services.
Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 470-71, 355 A.2d at 140-41 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
145 Id. at 470, 355 A.2d at 140 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). The ChiefJustice implied that the district-by-district monitoring envisioned by the law would ultimately
prove ineffectual. Id. (Hughes, C.J., concurring). See supra note 28 for a description
of the state monitoring system. See also Abbott, 119 N.J. at 311, 575 A.2d at 371.
(suggesting that the more practical route to a thorough and efficient education was
fully equalized spending per pupil).
146 See Robinson V, 69 NJ. at 474, 475, 355 A.2d at 142, 143. (Hughes, C.J.,
concurring).
147 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
148 Id. at 166, 358 A.2d at 462 (Pashman, J., dissenting). The supreme court's
injunctive relief was issued on an Order to Show Cause which read:
On and afterJuly 1, 1976, every public officer, state, county or municipal, is hereby enjoined from expending any funds for the support of
any free public school ....
Id. at 160, 358 A.2d at 459. The court order explicitly excluded expenditures for
debt service, bond obligations, maintenance of school property, teachers' pensions,
health insurance premiums, and all outstanding contractual indebtedness. Id.
149 See Note,Judicial Self-Legitimization, supra note 17 at 518 n.81. In response to
the supreme court's order, State Senator Alene Ammond (D.-Camden) exclaimed:
"I've never heard of anything so coercive. [The Legislature] might as well just
close up shop and go home." Id. at 518, n.84. (quoting Anastasia, Marcase Says
Schools Need 'Survival' Funds, The Philadelphia Inquirer, May 14, 1976, at 6-A, col.
5), one commentator argued: "To characterize it as a traditional remedy is to ignore the effect of the decision -judicial promotion of a coercive measure designed
to force the legislature to raise and appropriate a very large sum of money." Id. at
518 n.81. The court's injunction also led to a resolution seeking the impeachment
of the fiveJustices who voted in the majority. See A. REs. 30, 197TH LEG., 1ST SESS.
(1976). Sterling Regional High School in Somerdale openly defied the injunctive
order. See The Courier-Post, July 2, 1976, at 1, col. 1. Three local school boards
instituted separate civil actions in the United States District Court (D. N.J.) seeking
to restrain the New Jersey Supreme Court's order as, inter alia, a violation of New
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tice Mountain and Justice Pashman filed separate dissenting
opinions, both of which criticized the holding as unwarranted judicial activism with real implications for usurping the legitimate
legislative function.' 5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Mountain argued strongly
for judicial restraint, noting that the activism of the majority was
violative of the separation of powers' 51 and inherently antidemocratic. 152 The Justice further cautioned that the court's decision posed a serious and systemic threat to its own power of
legitimacy. 5 3 Justice Mountain characterized the majority's remedy as both politically coercive and ultimately harmful to the interests of education. 54 Fortunately, the crisis precipitated by the
court's injunction was averted by the timely enactment of funding legislation for the new education law. 155 Consequently, the
supreme court dissolved its injunction in Robinson VII.' 56
In its entirety, the Robinson v. Cahil1 57 litigation provided a
Jersey school childrens procedural due process rights under the federal constitution. See supra note 18 at 157. The federal district court, sitting en bane, preserved
the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court by a 9 to 2 vote. Id. at 158.
150 Robinson VI, 70 N.J. at 162-64, 358 A.2d at 460-61 (Mountain, J., dissenting);
Id. at 175-76, 358 A.2d at 467-68 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 163, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain,J, dissenting). Justice Mountain noted
that there was an inherent incompatibility between the judicial power to interpret
constitutional meaning and the power to compel or coerce its implementation. See
id. The dissent thus implied that the court was using its legitimate role as the final
expositor of the constitution as a bootstrap to justify its assumed role as the constitutional enforcer. See id. "[I]t should not be overlooked that the same small group
of persons will have been responsible for making the initial determination of unconstitutionality now invoked as the compelling reason for a further assertion of
power." Id.
152 See id. at 163, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Justice Mountain
explained that the exercise ofjudical activism resulted in the formulation of policy
by the judiciary in the absence of any attendant electoral accountability. Id.
153 Id. at 163-64, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
The most important quality of law in a free society is the power to
command acceptance and support from the community so as to
render force unnecessary, or necessary only upon a small scale against
a few recalcitrants. I call this quality the 'power of legitimacy' because
it appears to attach to those commands of established organs of government which are seen to result from their performance in an authorized fashion of the functions assigned to them. Such commands,
and only such, are legitimate.
Id. at 163, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain, J., dissenting) (quoting A. Cox, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103-05 (1976)).
154 Robinson VI, 70 N.J. at 165, 358 A.2d at 462 (Mountain, J., dissenting); See also
id. at 166, 358 A.2d at 462-63 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
155 Robinson VII, 70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
156 Id.
157 See supra notes 106-156 and accompanying text.
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new analytical framework for constitutional adjudication under
the state education clause.'15 Broadly stated, per pupil spending
disparities were relevant only to the extent that a given school
district failed to provide a requisite level of substantive education. 159 Although the Robinson V 160 court sustained the Act as
facially constitutional, its pronouncement emphatically contemplated a future challenge to the Act once it was implemented.' 6 '
That inevitable future challenge came in Abbott By Abbott v.
Burke.162 After disposing of the procedural question of an appropriate forum, 163 the New Jersey Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional as applied to twenty-eight poor urban school
districts.' 64 The supreme court's declaratory judgment further
mandated that educational spending in these districts remain
substantially equal to the spending in wealthy districts. 165 Significantly, the court precluded the state from relying on the local
property tax in poor urban districts to effectuate this end. 166 Finally, the court held that minimum aid, dispensed to relatively
wealthy school districts, was inherently counter equalizing, and
67
therefore unconstitutional.

THE NEW JERSEY SURPEME COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT

Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for a unanimous court, began
his analysis by tracing the constructional history of the thorough
and efficient education clause.168 The court recognized that judicial definition of the state education clause required both flexibil158

See Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 309, 575 A.2d 359, 370 (1990).

159 Id. "The clear thrust of our jurisprudence] was to render equal dollars per

pupil relevant only if it impacts on the substantive education offered in a given
district." Id.
160 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
161 Id. at 455, 355 A.2d at 131-32. Commenting on the facial constitutionality of
the Act, the Robinson V court -[n]oted that whether it may or may not pass constitutional muster as applied in the future to any individual school district at any particular time must quite obviously await the event." Id. (emphasis added).
162 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
163 See Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d 376 (1985). The supreme court
initially remanded the matter for an administrative proceeding to develop the complex evidentiary record necessary for eventual constitutional -adjudication by the
court. Id. at 301-02, 495 A.2d at 393. See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text
for a full description of the procedural history.
164 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 384-86, 575 A.2d at 408-09.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 386-88, 575 A.2d at 408.
167 Id. at 383-85, 575 A.2d at 407-08.
168 See id. at 303-13, 575 A.2d at 367-72 (citing Landis v. Ashworth (School District No. 44), 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
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and deference to the legislative function.17 0 After
recounting the constitutional standard utilized in the Robinson v.

Cahill litigation, 17 1 Chief Justice Wilentz noted a clear jurisprudential shift away from mere spending disparities toward a broad
analysis of substantive education.172 In passing, the ChiefJustice
observed the unique posture of the litigation whereby the education law under judicial review had been specifically enacted to
conform with the Robinson i173 court's prior declaratory
judgment.

174

After establishing the standard of constitutional compliance
to be accorded under the thorough and efficient education
clause, the court described the educational funding provisions
established by the Act. 1 75 Chief Justice Wilentz held that the Act
only partially ameliorated the disparity in school district taxing
power. 7 6 The court explained that the equalization aid provisions did not fully equalize per pupil spending of New Jersey
school districts. 17 7 Rather, the Act effectively created two distinct
classes of school districts: those districts with aggregate property
values at or below the GTB, and those affluent districts with aggregate property values in excess of the GTB.' 7 8 The court concluded that per pupil spending disparities between the school
169 Abbott, 119 NJ. at 303, 575 A.2d at 367. "[W]hat a thorough and efficient
education consists of is a continually changing concept." Id.
170 Id. at 304, 575 A.2d at 367. "The Legislature's role in education is fundamental and primary;... definition of the constitutional provision by this Court, therefore, must allow the fullest scope to the exercise of the Legislature's legitimate
power." Id.
171 See supra note 7 (listing the cases in the Robinson v. Cahill series). The substantive content of these opinions is discussed in supra notes 107-156 and accompanying text.
172 Abbott, 119 NJ. at 308, 575 A.2d at 369. The supreme court noted that the
Act provided a comprehensive standard of a thorough and efficient education
against which the court could adjudicate the constitutional obligation. Id. at 308,
575 A.2d at 369-70 (citing Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 463, 355 A.2d at 129).
173 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). See supra notes 107-122 and related text for
a discussion of the Robinson I court's declaratory relief.
174 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 315, 575 A.2d at 373. The law scrutinized by the court in
Abbott was enacted to replace the State School Aid Law (1954), as amended by the
Bateman Act. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:58-1 (repealed). The Robinson I court invalidated the State School Aid Law of 1954. Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 515-20, 303 A.2d at
295-98. "In short, we are the only state involved in a second round on this issue."
Abbott, 119 N.J. at 315, 575 A.2d at 373.
175 Id. at 324-333, 575 A.2d at 377-382. See supra note 10 and related text for a
description of the various state funding provisions under the Act.
176 Id. at 324, 575 A.2d at 377.
177 Id. at 325, 575 A.2d at 378. The statutory mechanics of state equalization aid
are discussed supra notes 36-41 and related text.
178 Id. at 325, 575 A.2d at 378.
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districts had actually worsened since enactment of the law. ' 79 Additionally, the Act continued to provide minimum aid in reduced
amounts' 80 to districts with aggregate property values above the
GTB.' 8 ' The court reasoned that this was also a causal element
in
s2
per pupil spending disparities between the school districts.'

In responding to the plaintiffs' contention that the entire system of public school funding violated the state constitution,
Chief Justice Wilentz maintained that the evidence of funding
disparity and deficient education was dispositive only with respect to twenty-eight poor urban districts.' 83 As a result of such
inequality, the court found that the students in these districts had
a greater degree of educational need than the students from the
179 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 334, 575 A.2d at 382. A considerable portion of the court's
opinion is devoted to the presentation of statistics detailing the pre-Act per pupil
spending disparities and the post-Act disparities. See id. at 324-47, 575 A.2d at 37789. For example, when the districts were statistically ranked in order of per pupil
expenditures, the difference in spending between the 5th and 95th percentile was
$898 in 1975-76, the fiscal year preceding the Act. Id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 383. Nine
years after implementation of the Act, however, per pupil spending disparities
among the same group of school districts had widened to $2,068, or $1,135 adjusted for inflation. Id. Spending disparities are discussed in supra notes 42-66 and
accompanying text.
180 Id. at 382, 575 A.2d at 406. Minimum aid accounted for $290 million in the
year prior to the Act, as compared to $48 million two years after enactment. Id.
181 Id. at 327-28, 575 A.2d at 379. In the budget year 1989-90, minimum aid
accounted for a mere $163 million, while equalization aid totalled $1.9 billion. Id.
at 328, 575 A.2d at 380. Minimum aid is described in supra note 47 and accompanying text.
182 Id. at 328, 575 A.2d at 379. Given that minimum aid was given only to those
school districts which did not receive equalization aid, the court concluded that
minimum aid was intrinsically counterequalizing. Id. The court suggested that the
rationale for dispensing minimum aid to school districts with comparatively higher
property wealth was to "facilitate the compromises needed to secure passage of
important legislation of this kind." Id. at 384, 575 A.2d at 408.
183 Id. at 342-43 & n.18, 575 A.2d at 386-87 & n.18. The court identified these
twenty-eight poor urban school districts through the use of the Department of Education's DFG classification scheme, in combination with the Department of Community Affairs' urban aid district classification scheme. Id. at 338-43 & n.18, 575
A.2d at 384-87 & n.18. See also supra note 60. The court further noted that the
twenty-eight poor urban school districts covered by its remedy contained 71% of
all minorities in the state during 1984-85. Id. at 342 & n.19, 575 A.2d at 387 &
n. 19. In the 1986-87 school year, minority enrollment in certain poor urban school
districts was:
Camden
95% minority
Newark
91% minority
Paterson
90% minority
East Orange
99% minority
Jersey City
85% minority
Irvington
94% minority
Trenton
88% minority
Id. The Court found these statistics not only indicative of a failing educational system, but also of societal neglect. See id. at 342-43, 575 A.2d at 387.

.1991]

NOTE

469

wealthier suburbs. '" The supreme court noted the presence in
poor urban school districts of an inverse correlation between the
magnitude of educational need and the availability of educational
opportunity.' 8 5 Chief Justice Wilentz posited that dollar input
was indeed relevant to the quality of substantive education afforded in a given district.' 8 6 While acknowledging that additional
state funding might not eliminate the constitutional violation,
Chief Justice Wilentz nonetheless concluded that poor urban
school districts were constitutionally entitled to the partial solution which increased dollar input might provide. 8 7 In considering the monitoring, certification, and enforcement provisions of
the Act, the court declared that the laudable efforts of the Department of Education had failed to ensure a thorough and efficient education in the poor urban school districts. 8 8
The supreme court rationalized that municipal overburden 8 9 in poor urban districts precluded the use of local property
taxes to achieve a constitutionally adequate education. 90 As a
question of fact, Chief Justice Wilentz rejected the ostensible authority of the Commissioner of Education to compel a tax increase in those districts which did not provide an education
deemed adequate by the state.' 9 1 The court opined that this statutory power was largely illusory because property tax increases
would result in adverse economic consequences in the poorer
districts, contribute to urban flight, and perhaps produce a net
diminution of property tax revenue. 19 2 Consequently, the court
stipulated that the Act could never achieve the state constitutional mandate because the funding provisions were premised on
the willingness of poor urban school districts to implement property taxes in the face of fiscal constraints of municipal
184 Id. at 338, 575 A.2d at 384. ChiefJustice Wilentz decided this case based on
the premise that children in poorer districts are equally as capable as those of richer
districts; their failure to perform accordingly was inextricably linked to their lower
socioeconomic status. Id. at 340-41, 575 A.2d at 385-86.
185 Id. at 338, 575 A.2d at 384.
186 Id. at 316, 575 A.2d at 374.
187 Id. at 374-75, 575 A.2d at 403.
188 Id. at 349, 353 & n.28, 575 A.2d at 390, 392 & n.28.
189 Municipal overburden is the term used by the court to describe poor districts
with the dual handicap of low property values and an excessive need for noneducational municipal services. Id. at 355-57, 575 A.2d at 393-94.
190 Id. at 357, 575 A.2d at 394.
191 Id. at 356-57, 575 A.2d at 393-94.
192 Id. at 355-57, 575 A.2d at 393-94. Indeed, the court found that during the
Commissioner's eight year term, he had never forced an increase in taxes (perhaps
with one exception). Id. at 357, 575 A.2d at 394.
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overburden.193

Chief Justice Wilentz summarily dismissed the state's assertion that bureaucratic mismanagement, rather than per pupil
94
spending disparities, was the cause of educational deficiency.'
The court discounted this notion of administrative incompetence, and instead found that the lack of sufficient funding was
the true causal element in an inferior education. ' 95 After narrowing the cause of educational deficiency to a lack of school district
spending, Chief Justice Wilentz proffered that the spending in
wealthy school districts was an accurate measure of the requisite
level of spending under the thorough and efficient education
clause. 196 The court arrived at this notion by discounting the
contrary argument that wealthy school districts were perhaps
spending above that which was required by the education
clause.' 97 Employing the spending of wealthy school districts as
the constitutional standard, ChiefJustice Wilentz mandated that
the state must ensure that the spending in poor urban school districts remain substantially equal to the spending in the wealthy
districts.'98 The court's holding and remedy therefore stressed
equality in per pupil expenditures between those New Jersey
school districts with the highest assessed property wealth, and a
limited group of twenty-eight poor urban school districts.' 9 9 After holding that funding disparities were an integral part of its
constitutional analysis, the court reasoned that minimum aid to
wealthier districts was unconstitutionally counterequalizing in
the context of existing legislation.2 °° In crafting its declaratory
relief, the supreme court stressed that the inadequacy of education in the twenty-eight poor urban school districts 20 ' reflected a
larger deterioration of a segment of impoverished American
193

Id. at 357, 386, 575 A.2d at 394, 408-09.

'94

Id. at 381, 575 A.2d at 406.

195 Id.
196 Id.

at 368, 575 A.2d at 399. The court emphasized the need to ensure that
students from poor urban school districts could compete in a society populated by
their affluent suburban counterparts. Id. at 383, 575 A.2d at 407.
197 Id. at 364, 575 A.2d at 397. The ChiefJustice inquired "[i]f these [additional
expenditures and broader curricula] are not integral to a thorough and efficient
education, why do the richer districts invariably offer them?" Id.
198 Id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408.
199 Id. at 394-97, 575 A.2d at 412-14.
200 Id. at 382-83, 575 A.2d at 407. The court recognized that "[m]inimum aid
may facilitate the [political] compromises needed to secure passage of important
legislation of this kind. Id. at 384, 575 A.2d at 408.
201 The school districts included in the court's remedy are:
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society.2 °2
CONCLUSION

The Abbott decision is unprecedented. In Abbott, the New
Jersey Supreme Court revisited the New Jersey school finance
dispute and invalidated the very legislation which was enacted to
conform with the Robinson 1203 court's decision. 20 4 The decision
is unique in its remedy; never before has a state court mandated
that per pupil spending in poor school districts must be equal to
per pupil spending in wealthy school districts. 20 5 By boldly addressing the abject failure of education within the state's poor
urban school districts, the court has forced the Legislature to focus its agenda on a dire and often neglected societal problem.2 °6
Abbott thus reflects the progressive tradition of the New Jersey
Supreme Court to initiate broad social reform.20 7
This activist tendency of the court in the area of school funding, however, conflicts with well deliberated legislative directives
in the same area. While such judicial activism is sometimes welcomed, the lack of cogent juridical standards, 20 8 coupled with the
inherent political nature of school financing, i.e., its substantial
reliance on local taxes, warrants the exercise ofjudicial restraint.
The court's activist approach in this arena is even more perplexing given the fact that as far back as Robinson I, the court specifiMillville
Perth Amboy
Asbury Park
Gloucester
Phillipsburg
Harrison
Newark
Bridgeton
Pleasantville
Hoboken
New Brunswick
Burlington
Trenton
Orange
Irvington
Camden
Passaic
Union City
Jersey City
East Orange
Vineland
Paterson
Keansburg
Elizabeth
Pemberton
West New York
Long Branch
Garfield
202 Id. at 392-93, 575 A.2d at 411-12.
203 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). See supra note 107-122 and accompanying
text.
204 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 315, 575 A.2d at 373; Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 520-21, 303

A.2d 273, 298 (1973).
205 Sullivan, "New Jersey Ruling to Lift School Aid For Poor Districts," N.Y.

Times, June 6, 1990, at 1, col.6. MarilynJ. Morheuser, an attorney with the Education Law Center, the organization which instituted the litigation in 1981, interpreted the Abbott decision as stating that "[i]t's all right for affluent districts to
spend more as long as the state then increases the spending for poor districts." Id.
206 See Bird, Abbott's Shrewd Activism, Deference, 125 N.J.L.J. 1604, at col. 1.
207 See Franzese, Georgia On My Mind, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1989). See also G.
TARR & M. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION at 205-24.
208 Robinson 1, 62 N.J. 473, 519, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (1973). The Robinson I court
candidly acknowledged that it lacked juridical standards against which it could evaluate a public school funding law. Id.
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cally deferred to and ordered the legislature to promulgate by
statute the standards for a thorough and efficient education
rather than judicially define the constitutional standards themselves. 20 9 One would have thought that the Robinson I court
would have waited until after the legislature had promulgated the
requested standards, and then assumed the task of evaluating
whether or not these standards had been met. Instead, the Robinson I court simultaneously invalidated the State School Aid Law
(1954),21 ° while ordering the legislature to statutorily define the

constitutional mandate of the thorough and efficient clause. 2 '
The holding in Robinson I was therefore a precarious exercise of
judicial activism because the court tacitly admitted
to a lack of
21 2
evidentiary criteria to support such a ruling.

Moreover, once the legislature developed guidelines of a
thorough and efficient education, as contained in the Public
School Education Act of 1975,213 the Abbott court, with the same
lack of juridical standards as in Robinson I, found itself functionally at odds with what the legislature had produced.21 4 For example, the certification process administered by the Department of
Education, and facially validated in Robinson V, was the process by
which the legislature monitored and enforced its standards. 21 5 It
was that very certification process, however, which was disregarded by the court in Abbott.21 6 Overall, this pattern reveals a
curious interaction between the New Jersey Supreme Court and
the legislature whereby the Robinson I court orders the legislature
to define what the constitution requires,21 7 but the Abbott court
reserves the right ofjudicial review to determine whether the leg209 See id. at 513, 519-20, 303 A.2d at 294, 297.
210 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A: 58-1 (repealed); see supra notes 107-122 and related

accompanying text for a discussion of the Robinson I opinion. See supra note 10 for
detailed school finance statutory history.
211 Robinson I, 62 NJ. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295.
212 Id.
213 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 (West 1989 & Supp.). This statute was enacted

to replace prior legislation, consistent with the court's seminal pronouncement in
Robinson I, 62 NJ. 473, 519, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (1973); Robinson V, 69 NJ. 449,
456, 355 A.2d 129, 132 (1976); See supra notes 123-156 and accompanying text for
a description of the interchange between the supreme court and the state legislature on this contentious matter; See also supra note 10 for an explanation of the
prior and subsequent statutory history. See also Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, 119 NJ.
287, 308, 575 A.2d 359, 369 (1990) (outlining the statutory definition of thorough
and efficient education).
214 Id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408.
215 Id. at 349-53, 575 A.2d 390-392.
216 Id. at 353, 575 A.2d at 392.
217 See Robinson 1, 62 NJ. 473, 513, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (1973).
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islature has complied with its own definition.21 8
Additionally, the constitutional process in the Robinson and
Abbott cases is undermined by the fact that the obligation embodied in the thorough and efficient education clause is textually
committed to the legislative branch. 219 By requesting specific
legislative guidelines, the Robinson I court itself strongly implied
that the substantive definition of a thorough and efficient education clause was the Legislature's responsibility to interpret.22 °
The Abbott court made a dubious judicial foray into the legislative
realm by functionally making complex policy decisions, yet remaining elusively beyond electoral grasp. While the goals of the
court may be supported by many, this does not diminish the
proposition that the court, as an unelected branch of govern22
ment, may have lacked the power to issue such a ruling.

'

Fortunately, the dramatic remedy forged by the Abbott court
is unlikely to precipitate the separation of powers crisis which was
occasioned by the decisions of Robinson I and its progeny. 222 Indeed, the remedy in Abbott appears to have been largely impleAbbott, 119 N.J. at 353, 575 A.2d at 392.
N.J. CONST. art VIII, § 4, 1, cl.1. provides:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free 'public schools for the instruction of all the children in this State between the ages of five and eighteen years.
Id. (emphasis added).
Consistent with the political question doctrine, most courts will decline to adjudicate constitutional claims which bear a textual commitment to a coordinate branch
of government. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
220 Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d at 294. In so doing, the court tacitly
admitted that the thorough and efficient education clause was outside the ambit of
a justiciable issue. Id. A court which lacks sufficient adjudicatory standards may
conclude that the issue is more a political question than ajusticiable issue. See Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
221 See generally R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA at 2.
The democratic integrity of law... depends entirely upon the degree
to which its processes are legitimate. A judge who announces a decision must be able to demonstrate that he began from recognized legal
principles and reasoned in an intellectually coherent and politically
neutral way to his result. Those who would politicize the law offer the
public, and the judiciary, the temptation of results without regard to
To give in to temptation, this one time,
democratic legitimacy ....
solves an urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears in the
American foundation. A judge has begun to rule where a legislator
should.
Id.
222 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 389, 575 A.2d at 410. The court maintained that "[d]espite
the experience over these many years, we continue to believe that the Legislature
will conform." Id. See supra notes 123-156 and accompanying text (describing the
separation of powers confrontation attendant to the Robinson v. Cahill litigation).
218
219
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mented through the Quality Education Act of 1990,223 the school
funding law crafted by Governor James Florio.2 2 4 The new law

actually exceeds certain aspects of the Abbott ruling by providing
increased state aid to 356 poorer school districts, 2 5 while termi
nating state aid to 150 affluent school districts for teachers' pensions, Social Security, and retiree health benefits. 2 6 Any
sustained public criticism of the Abbott opinion may therefore
have been subsumed 22 7 by the larger controversy surrounding
223 L. 1990, c. 52, § 90, effectiveJuly 1, 1990. The Quality Education Act of 1990
was enacted to replace the Public School Education Act of 1975, which was invalidated by the court in Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363. A complete description of the school funding statutory history can be found in supra note 10.
224 See Braun, School Chiefs Say Funding Law Threatens the Best, The Star-Ledger
(Newark), October 26, 1990, at 1, col. 1. The Florio administration had been formulating its school funding plan prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in
Abbott. Kerr, Good News For Florio, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at B4, col. 1. The Abbott
judgment may therefore have assisted the Governor in achieving the passage of the
new education law despite the objections of many recalcitrant members of the legislature. See Sullivan, School Aid Ruling: The Court And Society, N.Y. Times, June 10,
1990, at 1, col. 6; Hester, Decision Draws Mixed Reaction From Leaders, The StarLedger (Newark), June 6, 1990, at 13, col. 1. See also infra note 226.
225 Kerr, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at B4, col. 1.; Braun, The Star-Ledger (Newark), October 26, 1990, at col. 1. The 30 poorest school districts in NewJersey will
receive 40% of the $1.1 billion in new state aid under the law. Hanley, School Officials Vent Anger on New Jersey Financing Law, N.Y. Times, November 1, 1990, at B1,
col. 2. In the five budget years commencing July 1, 1991, state aid to Camden,
Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, and Trenton combined will rise from $728.6 million
to nearly $1.3 billion. Hanley, Florio School-Aid Plan: Cutting Two Ways at Once, N.Y.
Times, June 22, 1990, at B2, col. 1.
226 Id. The Abbott court emphatically preserved the validity of state pension aid in
the form of state payments into the Teacher's Pension and Annuity Fund. Abbott,
119 N.J. at 383-84, 575 A.2d at 407. The Quality Education Act of 1990 will nonetheless terminate state pension aid and shift these payments from the state to the
150 affected local school districts. Hanley, Florio School-Aid Plan: Cutting Two Ways
At Once, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at B2, Col. 1. This particular state aid
amounted to roughly $900 million for the budget year 1990-1991. Id. The loss of
this state aid is in addition to the loss of an aggregate $293 million in other state aid
among 220 relatively affluent school districts in the five years commencing July 1,
1991. Id. See infra note 227 for popular criticism of this aspect of the Quality Education Act of 1990. As of this writing, however, the State Senate was considering
amending the Quality Education Act of 1990. Reilly, School Aid Shift, The StarLedger (Newark) January 25, 1991, at 1. col. 1. The proposed legislation would
temporarily restore state pension while reducing state education aid in favor of
property tax relief for suburban municipalities. Id. The amendments, sponsored
by State Senate President John Lynch (D-Middlesex) and State Senate Majority
Leader, Daniel Dalton (D-Camden), would reduce the $1.1 billion in state aid
under the Quality Education Act of 1990 by $395 million. Id.
227 Although the Abbott decision provoked some public criticism, it was much less
controversial than the Robinson decisions. See Hester, Decision Draws Mixed Reaction
From Leaders, The Star-Ledger (Newark), June 6, 1990, at 13, col. 1. State Senate
minority leader John Dorsey (R-Morris) opined that Abbott By Abbott v. Burke "[i]s
one more example of interference by the courts in what is the constitutional re-
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the Quality Education Act of 1990,228 and particularly the massive tax hikes engineered by the Governor to fund the new education law. 229 The incipient separation of powers crisis in Abbott
was thus averted by the fortuitous introduction by Governor
Florio of legislation which went far beyond the court's mandate.2 3 0 Nonetheless, Abbott sets at best a disquieting precedent
for the real and antidemocratic usurpation of the legislative
function.
The legitimacy of the Abbott opinion is further undermined
by its reliance on the flawed precedent of Robinson J.2 3 ' Although
Robinson I established the modern precedent for constitutional
adjudication under the state education clause, 23 2 the opinion was
based on two fundamentally mistaken premises which profoundly
sponsibility of the [I]egislature and local governments[;] [i]t
is an absolute abrogation of the separation of powers between the branches of government." Id. State
Assembly minority leader Garabed Haytaian (R-Warren) questioned the timing of
the Abbott decision and its similarity to Governor Florio's proposed education law.
"I am probably going to get in trouble with a lot of people for saying this but the
Supreme Court Justice is a former assemblyman from the Democratic ranks and
from a family with the prominent name of Wilentz. Here we have one party (the
Democrats) in control of the Legislature, one party (the Democrats) in control of
the executive branch and one party in control of the judiciary. I have always been
opposed to one-party government in the United States." Hester, Ruling Comes At An
Ideal Time For Florio, Dems, The Star-Ledger (Newark), June 6, 1990, at 13, col. 1.
228 Braun, School Chiefs Say Funding Law Threatens the Best, The Star-Ledger (Newark), October 26, 1990, at 1, col. 1. A coalition of 25 school superintendents agreed
with the equalization mandate of Abbott By Abbott v. Burke, yet urged the Florio administration to revise the Quality Education Act of 1990. Id. A position paper issued by the superintendents stated that "[w]eak schools should not be made strong
by making strong schools weak." Id. New Jersey Education Association president
Betty Kraemer initially hailed the Abbott opinion as recognizing "[t]hat our urban
districts have been shortchanged by the current equalization aid formula used to
fund education." Hester, Decision Draws Mixed Reaction From Leaders, The StarLedger (Newark), June 6, 1990, at 13, col. 1. Yet after passage of the new education law, Ms. Kraemer vowed that the New Jersey School Board Association, the
largest teachers' union aggrieved by the termination of pension aid, would strive to
unseat both Governor Florio and those Democratic legislators who voted in favor
of the school bill. Kerr, Florio School-Aid Package Gains Final Approval, N.Y. Times,
June 22, 1990, at Al, col.3. Ms. Kraemer explained: "Our people are angry and
feel they have been betrayed. I never thought I'd be in bed with the Republicans."
Id.
229 The funding for the new education law will be derived from part of a $1.25
billion income tax hike, in combination with a $1.5 billion sales tax increase. Hanley, Florio School-Aid Plan: Cutting Two Ways at Once, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at
B2, col. 1. See Appendix I.
230 Kerr, Good News For Florio, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at B4, col.1; Sullivan,
School Aid Ruling: The Court And Society, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1990, at 1, col.1.
231 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
232 See Robinson V,69 N.J. 449, 455-56, 355 A.2d 129, 131-32 (1976); Abbott, 119
N.J. at 300-01, 306, 575 A.2d at 365, 368-69.
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strained subsequent decisions by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Most importantly, the Robinson I court misread the central proposition of Landis v. Ashworth (School District No. 44).233 While the

opinion in Landis emphatically eschewed the notion of state-wide
educational equality,23 4 the Robinson I court cleverly transmuted
Landis to support the notion that the state education clause required some amorphous level of minimum equality. 35 In Abbott,
Chief Justice Wilentz states that the initial construction of the
state education clause in Landis " was permeated by the concept
of equality.

'2 3 6

This statement demonstrates the continued mis-

interpretation of precedent propagated by Robinson J.237
A second flaw in Robinson I was the court's application of the
state education clause to an evidentiary record which the Robinson
I litigants had crafted for an alleged violation of the state and
federal equal protection clauses. 23 8 Although the evidence of

spending disparities adduced by the Robinson I litigants logically
supported their claim under conventional equal protection analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court was precluded from affirming
this theory by the intervening decision of the United States
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.239The Robinson I court was therefore relegated to use a rec233 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (1895); see supra notes 98-122 and related text for a
discussion of the holdings in Landis and Robinson I.
234 Landis v. Ashworth, 57 NJ.L. at 512, 31 A. at 1018; see supra note 105.
235 Compare Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 514-15, 303 A.2d at 294-95 ("But the Court did
find that ... the state required equality within the intended range of that amendment, permitting local decisions above and beyond that mandated education.") with
supra note 105. See also Abbott, 119 N.J. at 304-05, 575 A.2d at 367-68 (interestingly,
the Abbott court quotes Robinson I for its construction of Landis rather than Landis
itself).
236 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 304, 575 A.2d at 367.
237 See supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
238 See Gibbons, supra note 4, at col.3. Although the trial court in Robinson I utilized the state and federal equal protection clause to invalidate the school funding
law, the New Jersey Supreme Court was precluded from affirming this theory by the
intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied 411 U.S. 959 (1973). See
supra note 112.
239 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied 411 U.S. 959 (1973). In San Antonio, the United States
Supreme Court rejected a challenge under the equal protection clause to a Texas
system of public school funding. See id. The Texas system relied in part, like the
New Jersey system, on a local ad valorem property tax. Id. at 7. Because local school
districts would receive less of a government service based on their local property
wealth, the plaintiffs claimed that the funding law functionally discriminated against
them on the basis of wealth. Id. at 7-8, 16-17. The plaintiffs further alleged that this
discrimination infringed on their purported fundamental right to education. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected both theories, holding that discrimination on the basis
of wealth was not a suspect classification, and that the right to public education was
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ord of numerical spending disparities to determine the
constitutional inadequacy of substantive education under the
thorough and efficient education clause. 240 Despite the fact that
the Robinson I court was precluded from using equal protection
analysis, spending disparities .alone do not conclusively evidence
a substantive violation of the state education clause. 24 ' The
Robinson I court thus established an improvised constitutional
analysis wherein the very substance of education, guaranteed by
the state education clause, would now be evaluated by the simplistic input of money alone.
Rather than boldly revamp this ad hoc and deficient constitutional analysis, Abbott chose instead to labor under the logical
The
inconsistencies fostered by Robinson I and its progeny. 242Th
central flaw in the court's reasoning is the continued attempt to
define a thorough and efficient education by means of a pecuniary yardstick. The court asserts that only a failure to render adequate substance in education will render a funding law
unconstitutional; however, the court's decisions are necessarily
driven by a limited evidentiary tool of spending disparities.2 4
Chief Justice Wilentz isolated the cause of educational deficiency
to a lack of school district spending, and thereafter posited that
the level of spending in wealthy school districts was an accurate
measure of the constitutional requirement.244 The court supported this attenuated conclusion by rejecting the contrary notion that wealthy school districts were spending more than the
constitutional requisite.245 Yet this argument implicitly suggests
that a thorough and efficient education is defined by how much
the most affluent suburbs spend. At its most rudimentary level,
this spurious correlation is analogous to characterizing a Porsche
as thorough and efficient transportation merely because it is
purchased by a wealthy individual. The court's remedy effecnot fundamental. Id. at 18, 40. Thus, the court rejected both of the familiar predicates for strict scrutiny analysis of the law under the equal protection clause. Id. at
40-56.
240 Robinson I, 62 N.J. 473, 515-16, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973); Abbott, 119 N.J. at
306, 575 A.2d at 368-69; see supra notes 112-122 and accompanying text.
241 See Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295.
242 See generally Abbott, 119 N.J. 303-16, 575 A.2d. 367-73 (Robinson I continues
to serve as the basis for the court's evaluation of the thorough and efficient clause.)
243 See Abbott 119 N.J. at 309, 575 A2d. at 370.
244 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 368, 575 A.2d at 399-400.
245 See id. at 364, 575 A.2d at 397. The Chief Justice inquired "[i]f these [additional expenditures and broader curricula] are not integral to a thorough and efficient education, why do the richer districts invariably offer them?" Id.
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tively defines a thorough and efficient education in terms of per
pupil spending, thus rendering perfunctory statements to the
contrary an intellectual shell game.246
As a related matter, ChiefJustice Wilentz attempts to justify
equalization by stressing the need to enable poor urban students
to compete with affluent suburban students in a modem economy. 24 7 Yet this rationale implicitly defines academic excellence
in wealthy school districts as counterequalizing. The concept of
an affluent school district providing education above and beyond
the constitutional requirement is therefore rendered untenable
by Abbott, 248 despite the fact that Landis and Robinson I emphatically contemplated this prospect.249 Indeed, Abbott is noticeably
short on cogent legal reasoning, and rather long on compassion
for the plight of students in poor urban school districts.25 °
Although the court is to be commended for attempting to grapple with this deeply ingrained societal problem, the readers of
Abbott are fully cognizant of the tragedy of urban education. The
court's sociological observations therefore amount to needless
preaching to the converted. Unfortunately, the court's compassion does not explain why the thorough and efficient education
clause now mandates equalized per pupil spending.
ChiefJustice Wilentz also fails to address the unsettling fiscal
implications of the equalization remedy. When a wealthy school
district now utilizes its own property tax revenue to increase per
pupil spending, the court's scheme will force the state to increase
state aid to the twenty-eight poor urban school districts covered
by the Abbott equalization remedy. 2 5 ' Under the remedy proffered
246 See id. at 306, 575 A.,2d. at 368 ("[T]he clear import is not of a costitutional
mandate governing expenditures per pupil, equal or otherwise, but a requirement
of a specific substantial level of education").
247 Id. at 374, 575 A.2d at 402-03.
248 See id. at 364, 575 A.2d at 397.
249 See Landis v. Ashworth (School District No.44), 57 N.J.L. 509, 512, 31 A.
1017, 1018 (1895); Robinson I, 62 N.J. 473, 520, 303 A.2d 273, 298 (1973).
250 See id. at 340, 575 A.2d at 385-86. "We have decided this case on the premise
that the children of poorer urban districts are as capable as all others . . .[o]ur
constitutional mandate does not allow us to consign poorer children permanently
to an inferior education on the theory that they cannot afford a better one or that
they would not benefit from it." Id. "The Constitution does not tell them that since
more money will not help, we will give them less; that because their needs cannot
be fully met, they will not be met at all ...." Id. at 375, 575 A.2d at 403. "The
students of Newark and Trenton are no less citizens than their friends in Millburn
and Princeton." Id. "Judicial deference can go just so far." Id at 322, 575 A.2d at
376.
251 See id.at 385-86, 575 A.2d at 408. The potential political consequences from
this aspect of the supreme court's ruling are posited in Lehne, The Unanswered Ques-
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by Chief Justice Wilentz, an affluent school district which raises
its own per pupil spending becomes something of a fiscal renegade to the rest of the state. Given the fact that middle income
districts will tend to shoulder the tax burden for increased state
aid to poor urban districts,2 52 there will be strong incentives for
these middle income districts to petition the state to restrain
wealthy school district spending through the enactment of statutory spending caps.253 If the legislature does in fact impose
spending ceilings on wealthy school districts, good schools will
ironically be made worse to create the fiscal illusion that bad
schools have somehow been made better. The court's holding
would therefore result in the imposition of mediocrity on affluent
school districts to comport with the constitutional orthodoxy of
equalization. Such a result would be the ultimate perversion of
the thorough and efficient education clause.
Perhaps Abbott can best be reconciled as yet another link in
the Robinson v. Cahill chain. ChiefJustice Wilentz may simply lack
candor in failing to express that equality of funding is not merely
the judicially chosen means to a thorough and efficient education, but rather the preordained adjudicatory goal since Robinson
I. The Robinson and Abbott cases could therefore be read together
as a long-term quest for absolute equality in educational expenditures,2 54 delayed only by intervals of calculated and prudent judicial deference to the legislative function.255 Interestingly, the
contradictions imbedded in the Robinson v. Cahill jurisprudence
are fully revealed by the intellectual dichotomy in Abbott: disparities in school district spending are not unconstitutional per se, but
equalized spending is now constitutionally mandated.256 This
tion: Who Pays for Abbott?, 125 N.J.L.J. 21, col. 1 (1990) ("Every time an affluent
suburb increases its per-pupil expenditures, [income] taxes in the middle districts
will increase, yet the schools in these districts will get nothing in return.").
252 See id.
253 The notion of spending caps on affluent school districts was proposed by state

Senator Matthew Feldman (D-Bergen) shortly after the Abbott decision. 125 N.J.L.J.
1604, at col. 4. (1990). Senator Feldman is chairman of the Senate Education Committee. Id.
254 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 358, 575 A.2d at 395. "[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that changing circumstances . . . may lead to an interpretation of the constitutional obligation as requiring ... equality of funding." Id.
255 The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted a similar cycle of activism and
deference in the area of exclusionary zoning. See Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New
Jersey Supreme Court'sJudiciousRetreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30 (1988). See also Bird,
Abbott's Shrewd Activism, Deference, 125 N.J.L.J. 1604, at col. 1. Professor Robert F.
Williams stated "It's powerful activism interspersed with deference, followed by
another shot of activism." Id.
256 See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 306, 385, 575 A.2d at 368, 408.
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awkward and incongruous proposition might be explained as
merely a short-term transition, laying the decisional ground work
for an eventual finding that disparities in school district spending
are indeed per se unconstitutional. Thus, the variance between
the court's opinion and its remedy is simply the imprimatur of
result oriented jurisprudence cloaked in superfluous reasoning.
In the words of ChiefJustice Wilentz, "[W]e do not foreclose the
possibility that changing circumstances ...may lead to an interpretation of the constitutional obligation as requiring ...equality
25 7
of funding.

The notion of a larger adjudicatory scheme in Abbott ensures
the continuation of public school funding litigation in New
Jersey.258 Indeed, Chief Justice Wilentz offers ample and unabashed instructions on how future litigants should proceed. 259
Besides suggesting that the present remedy may be expanded to
cover more school districts, 2 ° the court predicts that the state
education clause might require poor urban school districts to
outspend their affluent suburban counterparts. 26 ' Additionally,

the supreme court dimly warned of its willingness to go beyond
merely a monetary remedy in the future.262 Eventually, the state
may choose to eradicate the entire system of local property tax
funding, and the attendant tradition of local citizen control, in
order to effectuate full state funding of public education in New
Jersey.263 Paradoxically, the court itself opined that more money
may ultimately prove ineffectual, 264 a suggestion which reflects
both realism and, at the same time, a rather cavalier attitude toward the use of taxpayer money. Further, the fact that the court
Id. at 358, 575 A.2d at 395.
See Gibbons, supra note 4.
See Abbott, 119 NJ. at 320, 575 A.2d at 376. "We do notforeclose the possibility that at some other time a different record might lead to the conclusion of total
systemic failure that sweeps in even [middle income] districts .... Id. "A thorough
and efficient education . . .necessarily means that in poorer urban districts something more must be added to the regular education in order to achieve the command of the Constitution." Id. at 374, 575 A.2d at 403.
260 See id.
261 See id.
262 Id. at 388, 575 A.2d at 410.
263 See Note, Equal EducationalOpportunity Revisited: Abbott v. Burke And The "Thorough And Efficient" Law In New Jersey, 40 RurrGERS L. REV. 193, 233 (1987) (arguing
that full state funding would be "the most logical and equitable solution to the
disparities in educational financing in New Jersey").
264 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 374-75, 575 A.2d at 403. See also Lehne, The Unanswered
Question: Who PaysforAbbott?, 125 N.J.LJ. 21, col. 1 (1990). "Robinson contributed to
the increases in educational costs in New Jersey, but [it is hard] to identify any way
in which it improved the quality of urban education." Id.
257
258
259
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foresees the real possibility of failure of the Abbott remedy ultimately guarantees a viable future for public school funding
litigation.26 5
The simplistic monetary remedy in Abbott turns a blind judicial eye to the intractable socioeconomic problems that are inextricably linked to deficient education in poor urban school
districts. Moreover, the lack of sound constitutional analysis and
principled legal reasoning in Abbott seriously undermines the legitimacy of the court's ruling. Ultimately, deeply entrenched socioeconomic problems in American society are not susceptible to
the quick-fix, the political sound-bite, or the dramatic court injunction. It is difficult to imagine that the court's intervention
into the area of school funding will produce the envisoned results. It is particularly ironic to assume that spending disparities
are a determinative element in the failure of poor urban school
districts when New Jersey spends more per pupil than any state
in the United States or any nation in the world.266 Unfortunately, the court's remedy may prove to be merely pecuniary
ointment on an intransigent socioeconomic cancer.
Richard D. Ballot
265 See Hanley, School Officials Vent Anger in New Jersey FinancingLaw, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1990, at B.1, col. 2. Despite the large increase in state aid afforded by the
Quality Education Act of 1990, poor school districts will still have to increase local
property taxes. Id. Marilyn Moreheuser, the attorney who initially instituted the
Abbott litigation, expressed dissatisfaction with the new law and its compliance
with the Abbott mandate: "If I don't get the [legislative amendments], we'll have to
go back to court." Id.
266 See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 393, 575 A.2d. at 412; Lehne, The Unanswered Question:
Who Paysfor Abbott?, 125 N.J.LJ. 21, col. 1, (1990).

482

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:445

APPENDIX I
The following table for Northern New Jersey school districts
illustrates:
1. The distribution of state school aid before and after the
Quality Education Act of 1990;
2. The average household income in the given community;
3. The combined effect of income tax changes and property
tax changes for an average family of four effectuated by the
new tax laws.
(The property tax figures do not represent any changes which
may be enacted by local school districts to compensate for the
loss or gain of state school aid). (Figures are omitted where
the school district and municipality do not coincide).
TOWN OR

SCHOOL AID

SCHOOL AID

DisTRicT

FOR '90-'91

FOR

BERGEN COUNTY
Allendale
$1,239,104
Alpine
426,719
Bergenfield
6,151,542
Bogota
2,412,271
Carlstadt
653,051
Carlstadt-E.
Rutherford
748,605
Cliffside Park
3,166,500
Closter
1,548,334
Cresskill
1,989,945
Demarest
902,016
Dumont
5,199,263
E. Rutherford
947,460
Edgewater
790,611
Elmwood Park
2,985,638
Emerson
1,968,469
Englewood
5,885,183
Englewood Cliffs
877,177
Fair Lawn
6,749,787
Fairview
1,996,829
Fort Lee
4,453,821
Franklin Lakes
1,678,674
Garfield
4,354,161
Glen Rock
3,023,220
Hackensack
8,605,911
Harrington Park
835,776
Hasbrouk Heights
2,135,793
Haworth
549,697

'95-'96

AVG.
INCOME

TAX
CHANGE

$411,803
231,723
10,545,579
5,278,333
376,449

$116,635
418,115
44,059
41,241
33,142

$1,318
11,546
-250
-258
-181

431,137
1,914,146
743,671
563,285
493,825
9,273,317
501,133
813,260
1,867,296
1,705,029
4,535,951
593,424
4,301,276
3,656,227
2,468,842
1,175,731
7,819,520
2,222,712
5,246,572
932,435
839,155
231,638

64,164
67,924
77,101
97,025
43,199
33,328
36,519
89,515
59,336
126,632
143,583
53,633
29,725
91,051
196,836
24,832
79,038
49,096
83,185
46,289
106,307

-240
-186
-171
319
-261
-64
-168
$18
-210
1,216
1,677
-247
-297
152
3,962
-318
-128
-249
-30
-256
625
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(Table Continued)
TOWN OR

SCHOOL AID

DisTRicT

FOR

'90-'91

SCHOOL AID

FOR

'95-'96

AVG.

TAX

INCOME

CHANGE

BERGEN COUNTY (CONT.)
Hillsdale
Ho-Ho-kus
Leonia
Little Ferry
Lodi
Lyndhurst
Mahwah
Maywood
Midland Park
Montvale
Moonachie
N. Highland Reg.
N. Valley Reg.
New Milford
North Arlington
Northvale
Norwood
Oakland
Old Tappan
Oradell
Palisades Park
Paramus
Pascack Valley Reg.
RAM Indian Hills
Reg.
Park Ridge
Ramsey
Ridgefield
Ridgefield Park
Ridgewood
River Dell Reg.
River Edge
River Vale
Rochelle Park
Rockleigh
Rutherford
Saddle Brook Twp.
Saddle River
South Hackensack
Teaneck
Tenafly

1,667,186
918,402
2,158,748
1,636,837
4,268,140
3,492,505
3,736,536
1,694,077
1,810,884
1,314,583
522,170
1,923,600
4,102,443
3,150,444
2,422,915
818,153
743,255
2,491,634
840,608
806,773
2,514,192
6,120,147
4,136,725

442,615
541,806
2,661,794
2,041,471
5,681,932
4,943,272
3,324,330
821,927
3,016,533
783,309
366,947
1,144,282
5,069,297
2,769,182
3,444,092
767,897
309,315
1,623,398
253,945
282,931
1,037,402
3,247,179
2,976,027

4,446,929
2,101,174
4,182,860
2,216,670
2,660,237
7,826,712
2,628,469
1,156,468
1,935,788
883,861
40,742
3,688,488
2,443,547
458,584
462,356
9,435,900
3,500,234

2,041,202
600,379
2,213,343
4,253,213
2,385,905
5,459,704
1,283,820
456,926
1,734,079
596,927
29,344
6,870.218
977,544
254,761
273,166
5,240,563
1,009,361

75,035
151,033
70,745
38,378
29,887
33,159
85,720
45,425
48,217
96,643
35,176

-178
2,308
-200
-216
-283
-212
-2
-259
-232
357
-183

47,933
36,664
48,484
79,245
59,996
101,758
89,741
41,021
59,232

-254
-214
-235
-103
-168
827
104
-282
-206

66,609
83,028
39,326
39,081
124,292

-185
-48
-230
-241
1,569

54,664
82,011
37,831
122,014
50,837
39,384
327,672
32,380
72,684
139,171

-247
-66
-230
1,321
-226
-189
8,883
-294
-198
1,618

484

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:446

(Table Continued)
TOWN OR
DisTRIcT

SCHOOL AID

SCHOOL AID

FOR '90-'91

FOR

'95-'96

AVG.

TAX

INCOME

CHANGE

BERGEN COUNTY (CONT.)
Upper Saddle River
Waldwick
Wallington
Washington Twp.
Westwood
Westwood Reg.
Woodcliff Lake
Wood-Ridge
Wyckoff

1,528,808
2,803,018
1,704,864

510,007
3,881,324
1,989,333

-

160,534
50,654
28,849
68,414
51,124

2,640
-231
-285
-178
-233

4,164,134
862,653
1,361,820
2,548,510

1,717,323
193,170
1,089,814
1,035,495

151,455
44,400
100,374

2,336
-237
804

17,601,357
1,052,506
1,539,829
3,938,251
9,440,349
114,424,090
9,095,148
10,151,398
2,371,211
33,599,492
2,699,671
21,559,270

34,777,781
2,233,174
2,439,004
8,678,794
18,005,422
213,447,557
17,496,667
26,036,255
1,550,915
65,119,737
4,303,430
45,939,980

37,254
30,039
75,533
32,186
56,440
32,907
38,065
37,916
55,627
31,025
43,342
40,258

-359
-389
-337
-431
-366
-463
-402
-371
-349
-406
-451
-390

8,305,700
9,609,552

14,5118,408
13,8()7,390

35,405
40,409
55,826

-465
-472
-520

3,922,254
2,224,206
62,303,346
162,588
974,081
2,042,083
47,868,946
7,894,086

1,28O,140
78 6,046

HUDSON COUNTY
Bayonne
East Newark
Guttenberg
Harrison
Hoboken
Jersey City
Kearny
North Bergen
Secaucus
Union City
Weehawken
West New York
ESSEX COUNTY
Belleville
Bloomfield
Caldwell
Caldwell-W.
Caldwell
Cedar Grove
East Orange
Essex Fells
Fairfield
Glen Ridge
Irvington
Livingston
Maplewood
Millburn
Montclair
Newark

111,4g91,635

10,620

5O)8,017
2,3 )0,865
76,9550,037
2,7( )1,582
-

3,680,245
10,470,852
310,229,351

1,4110,826
13,7410,881
499,6 19,905

-

65,870
32,257
280,308
56,921
99,223
32,245
104,205
71,915

218,828
108,428
27,249

-425
-382
6,128
-529
89
-413
548
456
4,082
306
-368

1991]
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NOTE
(Table Continued)

ToWN OR
DisTRicr

ESSEX COUNTY
North Caldwell
Nutley
Orange
Roseland
S.OrangeMaplewood
S.Orange
Verona
West Caldwell
West Essex Reg.
West Orange
PASSAIC COUNTY
Bloomingdale
Clifton
Haledon
Hawthorne
Lakeland Reg.
Little Falls
North Haledon
Manchester Reg.
Passaic
Passaic County Reg.
Paterson
Pompton Lakes
Prospect Park
Ringwood
Totowa
Wanaque
Wayne
West Milford
West Paterson
MORRIS COUNTY
Boonton
Boonton Twp.
Butler
Chatham Borough
Chatham Twp.
School Dist.
Chathams

SCHOOL AID

SCHOOL AID

FOR '90-'91

FOR

720,653
5,730,206
20,894,439
411,159

344,476
9,035,488
35,054,567
360,195

9,417,112

6,256,964

2,820,862
2,812,913
9,589,761

'95-'96

TAX
CHANGE

142,485
45,572
32,461
78,863

1,226
-502
-389
-492

879,517

74,202
78,924
66,406

-194
-420
-500

1,389,631
4,461,682

117,259

-844

43,709
42,212
32,615
43,580

-304
-277
-351
-319

2,513,873
12,912,802
924,719
3,527,055
3,873,795
1,013,320
776,471
1,547,788
45,779,187
12,710,562
118,928,151
2,837,054
1,189,381
1,203,380
2,434,704
11,383,954

5,175,607
8,028,233
2,197,345
1,528,251
10,121,773
511,490
381,726
3,587,532
84,603,269
2,037,167
223,397,455
5,271,849
2,230,722

1,246,464
1,887,571
646,563
2,272,262

47,819
48,654

-252
-335

36,729

-306

663,144

27,993
45,072
30,087
58,353
45,147
42,185
71,793
49,577
40,803

-302
-287
-340
-230
-284
-280
-226
-249
-301

3,096,407
355,430
4,367,385

45,026
90,531
43,298

-221
160
-234
302
1,434

741,287
3,568,392
5,611,020

-

4,011,159

AVG.
INCOME

1,668,211

95,052
121,092
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(Table Continued)
TowN

OR

SCHOOL AID

SCHOOL AID

DIsTRICT

FOR '90-'91

FOR '95-'96

MORRIS COUNTY (CONT.)
1,576,645
Chester Twp.
Denville
2,308,659
Dover
6,916,175
1,774,406
East Hanover
Florham Park
1,082,025
Hanover Park Reg.
2,905,866
Hanover Twp.
1,780,142
Harding Twp.
586,451
Jefferson Twp.
7,448,733
Kinnelon
3,105,740
Lincoln Park
2,190,651
Madison
2,851,261
Mendham Borough
784,330
Mendham Twp.
757,084
Mine Hill Twp.
807,377
Montville
4,647,893
Morris Hills Reg.
5,577,786
Morris Plains
1,236,038
Morris School Dist.
7,748,083
Morris Twp.
Morristown
Mount Arlington
1,333,591
Mount Olive
9,761,491
Mountain Lakes
1,722,704
Netcong
675,335
Parsippany-Troy
Hills
11,927,813
Passaic Twp.
1,223,780
Pequannock Twp.
3,360,404
Randolph
8,954,623
Riverdale
560,502
Rockaway Borough
842,555
Rockaway Twp.
3,671,123
Roxbury
10,711,884
Victory Gardens
901,681
Washington Twp.
7,202,083
West Morris Reg.
4,442,005
Wharton Borough
1,636,124
UNION COUNTY
Berkeley Heights
2,189,028

1,753,282
1,995,549
12,188,625
1,067,342
505,813
1,817,739
1,011,936
363,079
15,282,839
2,447,846
3,693,871
920,728
339,215
370,315
932,146
6,293,998
10,071,109
587,680
4,639,104
2,071,009
17,757,499
1,997,628
1,107,660

AVG.
INCOME

TAX
CHANGE

107,969
63,689
36,531
58,835
91,728

1,067
-150
-229
-161
235

58,904
336,368
46,607
102,494
47,837
107,076
124,968
208,311
43,182
91,395

-137
8,753
-157
899
-197
1,015
1,569
4,368
-197
195

65,829

-146

111,959
68,916
53,455
55,422
148,259
35,281

1,144
-203
-161
-172
2,320
-187

6,327,751
724,856
5,452,388
18,938,083
308,677
650,781
5,372,193
21,289,437
2,200,943
13,410,823
9,024,884
3,107,656

58,829
72,178
52,729
82,850
41,060
46,434
56,758
56,265
28,153
73,885

-123
-166
-205
-7
-199
-191
-154
-142
-152
-98

41,810

-258

961,886

86,322

-40
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1991]

(Table Continued)
TowN OR
DismTar

SCHOOL AID

SCHOOL AID

FOR '90-'91

FOR

UNION COUNTY (CONT.)
1,976,861
Clark
5,097,914
Cranford
63,868,472
Elizabeth
Fanwood
618,769
Garwood
6,674,595
Hillside
1,098,948
Kenilworth
9,582,794
Linden
670,366
Mountainside
2,449,837
New Providence
30,061,447
Plainfield
6,119,584
Rahway
6,637,093
Roselle
4,943,191
Roselle Park
Scotch Plains7,886,962
Fanwood
Scotch Plains
1,426,446
Springfield
3,938,749
Summit
6,250,482
Union County Reg.
11,045,775
Union Twp.
7,817,269
Westfield
1,339,336
Winfield

'95-'96

761,619
5,000,991
126,619,214
766,835
13,324,143
492,275
8,904,990
356,070
710,222
53,328,016
10,981,408
9,993,540
7,570,801

AVG.
INCOME

TAX
CHANGE

49,444
56,260
32,342
57,516
32,527
45,699
35,065
31,860
89,388
76,304
43,422
36,697
35,535
37,625

-298
-253
-286
-225
-305
-265
-288
-229
19
-206
-263
-274
-283
-289

79,303
77,090
150,222

-176
-238
2,217

39,577
103,105
23,026

-282
470
-163

5,449,286
434,937
1,488,510
2,425,560
16,678,394
4,591,823
1,519,156

MIDDLESEX COUNTY
Carteret
Cranbury
Dunellen
East Brunswick
Edison
Helmetta
Highland Park
Jamesburg
Metuchen
Middlesex Borough
Milltown
Monroe
New Brunswick
North Brunswick
Old Bridge
Perth Amboy

6,344,355
800,363
2,036,181
14,570,303
20,854,041
621,838
3,245,071
1,972,116
3,096,895
2,993,434
1,611,630
5,037,115
16,477,494
7,061,833
31,670,728
23,549,416

15,266,564
573,065
3,809,550
31,617,849
24,051,146
1,501,561
6,158,424
3,555,616
3,094,813
5,878,361
2,668,685
3,756,599
28,133,721
13,200,244
47,473,624
56,682,318

33,114
85,035
37,434
68,581
57,301
36,795
63,117
39,514
61,385
41,074
55,841
41,776
33,261
66,210
48,592
27,861

-258
-60
-251
-163
-153
-144
-197
-173
-169
-245
-221
-222
-292
-174
-211
-249

488
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TOWN OR

SCHOOL AID

SCHOOL AID

DisTRicT

FOR '90-'91

FOR

'95-'96

MIDDLESEX COUNTY (CONT.)
Piscataway
12,008,239

25,013,202

Plainsboro
Sayreville
South Amboy
South Brunswick
South Plainfield
South River
Spotswood
Woodbridge

19,881,360
5,760,051
9,506,584
11,443,248
7,045,662
6,130,166
32,018,515

7,390,476
2,814,063
7,585,973
5,810,647
3,967,048
3,315,827
20,937,356

AVG.
INCOME

49,982
74,234
41,427
30,367
57,957
42,419
32,749
43,660
40,889

TAX
CHANGE

-164
-131
-189
-198
-139
-246
-248
-217
-233

Who Gains and Who Loses on School Aid and Taxes, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990 at 19,
col. 1.

